On Medium: Conservative Savagery and the Overturning of Roe v Wade
Read on about the pretense of conservative legal reasoning, the anachronism of bigotry, and how to see through the Supreme Court's sophistry in its overturning of Roe v Wade.
That's somewhat specious, I think. There are implications of moral principles which can be called "rights" even if they're legal fictions. It follows from the modern principles of liberty that women are people who are entitled to act freely as long as they don't impede anyone else's freedom. That could include the freedom to abort a fetus, assuming the fetus isn't a person with the same kind of freedom that should be respected.
But I agree that Democrats have lost the fight. I explain why that's so in these articles, and in an upcoming one specifically on abortion, called (tentatively) "How Democrats Bring a Knife to a Gun Fight":
Human rights, I maintain, are mythical. This might mean many things -- one scholar compiled a list of over 50 definitions of myth. In many definitions, myths are a kind of story. That is true of the original meaning, but I will depart from it. I would distinguish “myth” (beliefs) from “mythology” or legends (stories). I will instead combine two other attributes drawn from different scholarly traditions. To say that something is mythical is, for me, to say two things. The first thing is that myths like human rights are beliefs which aren’t statements of fact. Myths are believed in by some, or they used to be believed in, but they were never true in the ordinary ways in which statements are true.
The second aspect of myth is that it serves political functions -- specifically, to justify some social practice or movement or institution. This is the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski’s notion of the “mythical charter” of communities. In other words, “myth manufactures a sense of social belonging, a stratagem for social control.” I would extend this idea by adding that myth as a motivation is not confined to ideas supporting the status quo. It may provide a charter for imagined as well as for actual communities. Nationalist myths have justified nations before they came into existence. The cause of proletarian revolution has involved some myths. Their purpose is to validate and to incite. Georges Sorel frankly characterized the General Strike as an inspirational myth for class-conscious revolutionary workers. It was not inspirational for long, in part because, to make the point more generally, “institutions into which an element of myth enters may fulfill their functions better if these are not made too conscious, nor too many questions asked about them. - Bob Black
''You thereby recognize the traits of personhood that alone can conduct a thoughtful inquiry, and that make us different from and even more precious than most animals''
Anthropocentrism/speciesism is just another variation of conservative, essentially hierarchical, ideology. It is precisely because of this thinking that nonhuman animals are often treated in the worst possible way and that nature has been deformed or destroyed by greed. Interestingly, it is precisely the most primitive human beings who think of themselves as absolutely superior to other species to the point of treating them in very cruel ways.
The opposite for those who are more philosophically awake.
I have not seen an inherently bad human being more precious than any non-human animal.
In fact, I think that the human species, in general, has turned into a powerful and dangerous parasite. I view these exceptionally ignorant masses of people walking the streets with great contempt.
We can share, primarily, the ''personhood''. But, in qualitative and individual terms, the differences are enormous.
I look at the other species as ''at the apex of their evolutionary possibilities'', and the human species as an extremely degenerate species.
We have so much we could do to improve our lives and our interaction with this planet, but it seems that everything is heading towards the worst scenarios.
Value judgments aside, don't you think the distinguishing features of our species that add up to personhood are anomalous in the animal kingdom? Whether the anomaly is good or bad in the long run is another question. Personhood would be precious because of our greater potential for good or for bad behavioural outcomes.
This is indisputable. But looking at the behavior of other animals, especially domestic ones, I think this anomaly is not the product of absolute discontinuity, but of an extreme or complete expression of self-conscious behavior.
I think that conservatism is based on a simplistic understanding of non-human nature, because if it is true that brutal hierarchies predominate, even because of food chains, there is also room for altruistic behaviors among animals and even the existence of less ''fascistic'' social organizations.
I fully understand that a woman has to have autonomy in relation to her own body. But I also believe that abortion is a palliative practice, which should only be adopted in extreme cases or when all attempts to avoid pregnancy fail. There are many ways to avoid this, even vaginal intercourse, when interrupted, before the man's orgasm, can prevent pregnancy. Investing in sex education from an early age, significant availability of condoms, are some essential preventive measures. Any woman who has sex without a condom to the point of allowing ejaculation to occur inside her genital organ, without using any contraceptive method, becomes pregnant and decides to have an abortion, is acting irresponsibly. These cases should be avoided and, when they happen, criticized, especially when the woman has full agency in deciding what she wants during the sexual act and is adult enough to know the possible risks involved. Of course I can't just blame the woman. That's why I'm not totally in favor of abortion. Predominantly in favor. I also have a big complaint regarding abortion, for example, when it is discovered that the fetus has down syndrome. I find this extremely cruel, a kind of market-illiterate eugenics. If knowledge in genetics and human biology continues to expand but especially if it is turned into services by the capitalist system, most future parents are at risk of becoming Frankenstein doctors of their own children/creatures.
I agree that abortion is at best a necessary evil, especially when it's done in the second or third trimester (which is rare). But abortion is also part of human progress, and all facets of that progress are unnatural in being deliberately anti-natural. Personhood is godlike in enabling us to improve on the norms of the wilderness.
Hello, I was just going through your reply to EG on your "Is Having Children Wrong?" article. Since he didn't elucidate his position, I thought that I would post a response and try to explain it as I see it. For reference, here's your reply:
"Is your antinatalist point that desire is inevitably tragic since it sets us at odds with the world? We’re always desiring what can never be fully provided, so we’re inevitably unsatisfied? Thus, suffering is inevitable. This is just Buddhism. But while some Buddhists advocate the renouncing of all desires, including sexual ones, they wouldn’t make the grotesque utilitarian argument that all life should be exterminated to end suffering once and for all. Buddhists say the natural realm of life and death is illusory, so the act of trying to kill all living things would take the illusions much too seriously.
Anyway, what’s your argument that connects the tragic side of desires to the imperative to cease sexual reproduction or to the utilitarian conclusion that all life should be destroyed? Is it that we shouldn’t impose the tragedy of desires on the unborn since they didn’t ask for it? The problem is that the tragedy isn’t so one-sided. There are heroic tragedies, and there’s beauty in fragility and complex pleasure in certain forms of suffering. Evaluating these mental states isn’t so black and white.
If the having of desires were purely hellish, having children might indeed be plainly immoral, and our duty would be to escape from life as fast as possible. But very few people would say that their life as a self that tries to satisfy its desires is entirely a nightmare. We adjust our expectations for happiness to suit our circumstances, which is why poor, starving populations don’t commit suicide en masse."
Efilists, like some other extreme pessimists, believe that happiness is simply the absence of suffering. Every single good experience we have, such as eating something we enjoy, is only a way to reduce a prior harm, such as hunger. This means that life can never be good. Even if you satisfy all your desires, your life's value would only be 0 (since there wouldn't be any negative). However, it still wouldn't be a positive. Now, you will notice that the efilist position relies on hedonism. This means that they believe that pleasure and pain are the only sources of value (though, more accurately, they believe that suffering and its reduction are the only things that matter). One objection could be that non-existence simply cannot be better/good/less bad for someone if they don't exist to have a desire to avoid existence that is being satisfied by their lack of being. After all, even if happiness is simply the absence of suffering, it is still a conscious experience that is considered good/better for someone. When this experience isn't present, then does it make sense to claim that nothingness is always better? This might seem like a strange argument, but efilists and promortalists use similar arguments to suggest that death isn't bad and creating goods isn't necessary. They say that suicide cannot be against your self-interest due to the fact that you cannot have a desire for anything when you don't exist. Similarly, there aren't any souls or inanimate objects waiting desperately to experience life. But there are issues with this line of reasoning. Just because something isn't bad, it doesn't automatically mean it's good. If you need to have a desire in order for the absence of happiness to be bad, then one could also say that there must be a feeling of satisfaction in order for the absence of harms to be good.
If there's always some suffering in life, or if suffering (worry, fear, discontentment) is the default emotional state, that would mean life can never be ideal, which I think is what you mean when you say "life can never be good." But that doesn't discount the possibility that life can be good enough.
There's the ideal situation of paradise in a supernatural afterlife, and there's the approximation of an ideal, which we can call "the good life" in contrast to "a bad life." The good life might include some degrees of personal health, wealth, social relationships, freedom to pursue hobbies, living in a civilized, technologically developed society, and so on. Those lives are generally deemed good enough even if they're necessarily not perfect or free from suffering of any kind. The antinatalist's standards are just far too high.
But I appreciate your thoughts on this. (You might have posted them in the comments on that other article, but it's too late now.)
Some people doubt the very concept of "good" when it comes to life, since they see it as merely the absence of harms. I disagree with that because I believe that one can also say that suffering is the absence of happiness. If suffering has intrinsic disvalue, then happiness has intrinsic value. And yes, I certainly agree that life can be good enough. I would, however, like to live in a world wherein good enough can become excellent.
Efilists and other extreme pessimists would simply refuse to call even paradise to be truly good. In their view, existence can only be neutral at best (since all the positives we experience are apparently just tools to remove suffering devoid of any inherent value). However, I would agree with you on the excessively high standards that some antinatalists have for what constitutes a good life. Also, they can say that life isn't worth it because it isn't perfect, then why can't someone else say that life isn't worth living because it isn't completely terrible? Arbitrary double standards cannot be ethically justifiable.
I am sorry that I didn't notice the comment back when it was posted. Replying now seems a bit strange, and I also don't wish to start another long discussion when I've already had one fairly recently on his blog. Thank you for reading my comment!
Part 2: EG might say that this leads to absurd conclusions, such as the act of creating bad lives being deemed unproblematic. One could respond to this by saying that unnecessarily giving birth to harms could cause more suffering for those who exist. Furthermore, it's a bit rich to talk about absurd conclusions or reductios when your own worldview says that painfully killing off all life is ethical and that it's better to create a world wherein a few people experience immense harms instead of one where the total amount of harms would be slightly greater, but there would also be a lot of happiness. As for your point regarding heroic tragedies, the efilist might say that this is simply a coping mechanism and being heroic is good only insofar that it prevents greater suffering. As for impositions, I don't see how an act can be an imposition of it doesn't violate the desires of an existing individual who wanted something contrary to what you gave them. However, if creation can be seen as an "imposition" that violates consent, then one could also argue that existence can be a genuine gift, since it allows people to experience goods that they couldn't have asked for prior to their existence.
Forget about hellish desires, extreme pessimists believe that creating life is bad even if there is a mild desire. If both non-existence and existence are 0 (which is supposedly the best state the latter can achieve), then even -1 is simply unacceptable (unless, of course, you are giving birth to create a new Hitler that would end everything). When talking about people who keep living despite facing hardships, extreme pessimists, who say that they hate paternalistic individuals calling them depressed and therefore irrational (and I would agree that we shouldn't dismiss people's views or force them to live), put forward the argument that most people are simply pretending to like life or are deluded. And whether or not they like life is irrelevant, since non-existence cannot be worse for them.
The extreme pessimist's argument primarily seems to relie upon the claim that happiness doesn't have intrinsic value. It's only instrumentally good because it removes suffering. To me, this doesn't seem plausible. Firstly, let's say that this is indeed true. However, if pleasure and pain are synonymous with value, then a state wherein there is neither (non-existence) cannot be better or worse for someone. But kore importantly, I fail to see why we should accept the claim that happiness doesn't have intrinsic value (but suffering does possess intrinsic disvalue). We could say that suffering is also bad because it prevents us from experiencing a good. Just as eating is good because it removes the harm of hunger, thirst is bad because it removes the good of being satisfied. Fulfillment feels positive, so it does not seem sensible to ignore it. All in all, efilism fails to justify its fundamental claims about the nature of happiness and what can be valuable. This means that their project is, in my view, a recipe for disaster that will ultimately lead to misery and unethical acts. Hopefully, we shall be able to reduce the extent of the damage.
What's the context of this comment? Part 2 of what, the July 8, 4:12 comment by Anon? You seem to be arguing on both sides of the issue, so it's hard to disentangle what parts might be directed towards me. Whose worldview, for example, "says that painfully killing off all life is ethical"? Is that supposed to be mine?
The arguments you raise here seem to me to get lost in the weeds. It's important not to miss the forest for the trees. My articles on antinatalism and efilism aim to do the opposite, to expose their absurd implications. You don't begin from alleged hedonism (pleasure is good) or utilitarianism (maximization of happiness) and conclude that all life should be terminated (to avoid any trace of suffering)--at least, you don't argue in that way unless you're relying on a raft of confusions and fallacies.
These are not serious philosophical positions, which is why EG seems to carry them on in mere comment sections rather than in articles. In comments on Reddit, etc, you can hide the absurdity of what you're saying because the overall point gets lost in the weeds. It's the same with Inmendham: he gives these long point-by-point replies in hundreds of videos so that the thrust of what he's saying is always lost.
I am sorry if my comment was a bit equivocal or difficult to understand. I am most certainly writing against the efilist view, not yours. This comment was a continuation of my previous comment posted on July 8, 2022 at 4:12 AM. I had to post my reply in two parts because I had exceeded the word limit. Once again, I apologise for the inconvenience.
I agree that efilism is quite absurd. However, I think that it's better if those who don't think such conclusions are really absurd realise that their worldview is not ethically defensible. The forest is important. Nevertheless, one cannot forget that it was formed by individual trees.
I am not sure if my comment made it through, so I am posting another reply.
Yes, it's the second part of that comment. I had to write two comments because I had exceeded the word limit. I am not arguing from their side, but I apologise if I was somewhat unclear with what K said. I was referring to the efilist worldview, not yours.
I think that the trees and the forest matter equally. After all, the individual trees are what ultimately form the forest. I wish to demonstrate that the framework efilists use is contradictory (because it finds value in the absence of suffering in the void but don't find disvalue in the absence of happiness) and limited (because it ignores the reality of happiness).
Some people seem to take it seriously, which is a bit concerning. I hope that we shall be able to avert any major damage resulting from dark ideologies.
"The good life might include some degrees of personal health, wealth, social relationships, freedom to pursue hobbies, living in a civilized, technologically developed society, and so on. Those lives are generally deemed good enough even if they're necessarily not perfect or free from suffering of any kind." I don't disagree with this, but those who do not exist are not in need of any of those things.
A need is a condition or situation in which something must be supplied in order for a certain condition to be maintained or a desired state to be achieved. So I'm not sure the absence of life could qualify as a need.
My point was that if creating happiness isn't required because nobody in the void needs it, then neither is there a requirement to never create life, since non-existent beings don't experience satisfaction due to their lack of existence.
I was responding to the "those who do not exist are not in need of any of those things" point. This seemed to suggest that the positives are only required if there is a prior need. And, since inexistent people do not need happiness, it's absence isn't bad. But if this is true, then I think that one could also say that, even if non-existence isn't bad, it also cannot be good, since nobody in nothingness is satisfied due to their lack of existence. In summary, if the absence of life would only be bad if someone (before being born) needed it, then the absence of life would only be good if it satisfies their desire to avoid existence. In this case, the value of procreation becomes a more individualize matter that differs from situation to situation depending upon the impact it could have on people.
There are no rights, only fights. When someone says they have lost their "rights," what they are really saying is that they lost the fight.
ReplyDeleteThat's somewhat specious, I think. There are implications of moral principles which can be called "rights" even if they're legal fictions. It follows from the modern principles of liberty that women are people who are entitled to act freely as long as they don't impede anyone else's freedom. That could include the freedom to abort a fetus, assuming the fetus isn't a person with the same kind of freedom that should be respected.
DeleteBut I agree that Democrats have lost the fight. I explain why that's so in these articles, and in an upcoming one specifically on abortion, called (tentatively) "How Democrats Bring a Knife to a Gun Fight":
https://medium.com/discourse/why-democrats-are-inept-at-politics-b0bbe6648fb9?sk=155f6641cd7ddc511c52328ec4ce76f7
https://medium.com/discourse/the-hidden-depths-of-the-democrats-ineptitude-9a8ba883c806?sk=702a3d92f37c43ac73cb050ecb0de12e
Human rights, I maintain, are mythical. This might mean many things -- one scholar compiled a list of over 50 definitions of myth. In many definitions, myths are a kind of story. That is true of the original meaning, but I will depart from it. I would distinguish “myth” (beliefs) from “mythology” or legends (stories). I will instead combine two other attributes drawn from different scholarly traditions. To say that something is mythical is, for me, to say two things. The first thing is that myths like human rights are beliefs which aren’t statements of fact. Myths are believed in by some, or they used to be believed in, but they were never true in the ordinary ways in which statements are true.
DeleteThe second aspect of myth is that it serves political functions -- specifically, to justify some social practice or movement or institution. This is the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski’s notion of the “mythical charter” of communities. In other words, “myth manufactures a sense of social belonging, a stratagem for social control.” I would extend this idea by adding that myth as a motivation is not confined to ideas supporting the status quo. It may provide a charter for imagined as well as for actual communities. Nationalist myths have justified nations before they came into existence. The cause of proletarian revolution has involved some myths. Their purpose is to validate and to incite. Georges Sorel frankly characterized the General Strike as an inspirational myth for class-conscious revolutionary workers. It was not inspirational for long, in part because, to make the point more generally, “institutions into which an element of myth enters may fulfill their functions better if these are not made too conscious, nor too many questions asked about them. - Bob Black
''You thereby recognize the traits of personhood that alone can conduct a thoughtful inquiry, and that make us different from and even more precious than most animals''
ReplyDeleteAnthropocentrism/speciesism is just another variation of conservative, essentially hierarchical, ideology. It is precisely because of this thinking that nonhuman animals are often treated in the worst possible way and that nature has been deformed or destroyed by greed.
Interestingly, it is precisely the most primitive human beings who think of themselves as absolutely superior to other species to the point of treating them in very cruel ways.
The opposite for those who are more philosophically awake.
I have not seen an inherently bad human being more precious than any non-human animal.
In fact, I think that the human species, in general, has turned into a powerful and dangerous parasite. I view these exceptionally ignorant masses of people walking the streets with great contempt.
We can share, primarily, the ''personhood''. But, in qualitative and individual terms, the differences are enormous.
I look at the other species as ''at the apex of their evolutionary possibilities'', and the human species as an extremely degenerate species.
We have so much we could do to improve our lives and our interaction with this planet, but it seems that everything is heading towards the worst scenarios.
Value judgments aside, don't you think the distinguishing features of our species that add up to personhood are anomalous in the animal kingdom? Whether the anomaly is good or bad in the long run is another question. Personhood would be precious because of our greater potential for good or for bad behavioural outcomes.
DeleteThis is indisputable. But looking at the behavior of other animals, especially domestic ones, I think this anomaly is not the product of absolute discontinuity, but of an extreme or complete expression of self-conscious behavior.
DeleteI think that conservatism is based on a simplistic understanding of non-human nature, because if it is true that brutal hierarchies predominate, even because of food chains, there is also room for altruistic behaviors among animals and even the existence of less ''fascistic'' social organizations.
ReplyDeleteI tend to have a moderate opinion on abortion.
ReplyDeleteI fully understand that a woman has to have autonomy in relation to her own body. But I also believe that abortion is a palliative practice, which should only be adopted in extreme cases or when all attempts to avoid pregnancy fail.
There are many ways to avoid this, even vaginal intercourse, when interrupted, before the man's orgasm, can prevent pregnancy.
Investing in sex education from an early age, significant availability of condoms, are some essential preventive measures.
Any woman who has sex without a condom to the point of allowing ejaculation to occur inside her genital organ, without using any contraceptive method, becomes pregnant and decides to have an abortion, is acting irresponsibly.
These cases should be avoided and, when they happen, criticized, especially when the woman has full agency in deciding what she wants during the sexual act and is adult enough to know the possible risks involved.
Of course I can't just blame the woman.
That's why I'm not totally in favor of abortion. Predominantly in favor.
I also have a big complaint regarding abortion, for example, when it is discovered that the fetus has down syndrome.
I find this extremely cruel, a kind of market-illiterate eugenics.
If knowledge in genetics and human biology continues to expand but especially if it is turned into services by the capitalist system, most future parents are at risk of becoming Frankenstein doctors of their own children/creatures.
I agree that abortion is at best a necessary evil, especially when it's done in the second or third trimester (which is rare). But abortion is also part of human progress, and all facets of that progress are unnatural in being deliberately anti-natural. Personhood is godlike in enabling us to improve on the norms of the wilderness.
DeleteBut eliminating "defective' babies doesn't seems to me as progress in human personality//personhood or self-awareness.
DeleteHello, I was just going through your reply to EG on your "Is Having Children Wrong?" article. Since he didn't elucidate his position, I thought that I would post a response and try to explain it as I see it. For reference, here's your reply:
ReplyDelete"Is your antinatalist point that desire is inevitably tragic since it sets us at odds with the world? We’re always desiring what can never be fully provided, so we’re inevitably unsatisfied? Thus, suffering is inevitable. This is just Buddhism. But while some Buddhists advocate the renouncing of all desires, including sexual ones, they wouldn’t make the grotesque utilitarian argument that all life should be exterminated to end suffering once and for all. Buddhists say the natural realm of life and death is illusory, so the act of trying to kill all living things would take the illusions much too seriously.
Anyway, what’s your argument that connects the tragic side of desires to the imperative to cease sexual reproduction or to the utilitarian conclusion that all life should be destroyed? Is it that we shouldn’t impose the tragedy of desires on the unborn since they didn’t ask for it? The problem is that the tragedy isn’t so one-sided. There are heroic tragedies, and there’s beauty in fragility and complex pleasure in certain forms of suffering. Evaluating these mental states isn’t so black and white.
If the having of desires were purely hellish, having children might indeed be plainly immoral, and our duty would be to escape from life as fast as possible. But very few people would say that their life as a self that tries to satisfy its desires is entirely a nightmare. We adjust our expectations for happiness to suit our circumstances, which is why poor, starving populations don’t commit suicide en masse."
Efilists, like some other extreme pessimists, believe that happiness is simply the absence of suffering. Every single good experience we have, such as eating something we enjoy, is only a way to reduce a prior harm, such as hunger. This means that life can never be good. Even if you satisfy all your desires, your life's value would only be 0 (since there wouldn't be any negative). However, it still wouldn't be a positive. Now, you will notice that the efilist position relies on hedonism. This means that they believe that pleasure and pain are the only sources of value (though, more accurately, they believe that suffering and its reduction are the only things that matter). One objection could be that non-existence simply cannot be better/good/less bad for someone if they don't exist to have a desire to avoid existence that is being satisfied by their lack of being. After all, even if happiness is simply the absence of suffering, it is still a conscious experience that is considered good/better for someone. When this experience isn't present, then does it make sense to claim that nothingness is always better? This might seem like a strange argument, but efilists and promortalists use similar arguments to suggest that death isn't bad and creating goods isn't necessary. They say that suicide cannot be against your self-interest due to the fact that you cannot have a desire for anything when you don't exist. Similarly, there aren't any souls or inanimate objects waiting desperately to experience life. But there are issues with this line of reasoning. Just because something isn't bad, it doesn't automatically mean it's good. If you need to have a desire in order for the absence of happiness to be bad, then one could also say that there must be a feeling of satisfaction in order for the absence of harms to be good.
If there's always some suffering in life, or if suffering (worry, fear, discontentment) is the default emotional state, that would mean life can never be ideal, which I think is what you mean when you say "life can never be good." But that doesn't discount the possibility that life can be good enough.
DeleteThere's the ideal situation of paradise in a supernatural afterlife, and there's the approximation of an ideal, which we can call "the good life" in contrast to "a bad life." The good life might include some degrees of personal health, wealth, social relationships, freedom to pursue hobbies, living in a civilized, technologically developed society, and so on. Those lives are generally deemed good enough even if they're necessarily not perfect or free from suffering of any kind. The antinatalist's standards are just far too high.
But I appreciate your thoughts on this. (You might have posted them in the comments on that other article, but it's too late now.)
Some people doubt the very concept of "good" when it comes to life, since they see it as merely the absence of harms. I disagree with that because I believe that one can also say that suffering is the absence of happiness. If suffering has intrinsic disvalue, then happiness has intrinsic value. And yes, I certainly agree that life can be good enough. I would, however, like to live in a world wherein good enough can become excellent.
DeleteEfilists and other extreme pessimists would simply refuse to call even paradise to be truly good. In their view, existence can only be neutral at best (since all the positives we experience are apparently just tools to remove suffering devoid of any inherent value). However, I would agree with you on the excessively high standards that some antinatalists have for what constitutes a good life. Also, they can say that life isn't worth it because it isn't perfect, then why can't someone else say that life isn't worth living because it isn't completely terrible? Arbitrary double standards cannot be ethically justifiable.
I am sorry that I didn't notice the comment back when it was posted. Replying now seems a bit strange, and I also don't wish to start another long discussion when I've already had one fairly recently on his blog. Thank you for reading my comment!
Part 2: EG might say that this leads to absurd conclusions, such as the act of creating bad lives being deemed unproblematic. One could respond to this by saying that unnecessarily giving birth to harms could cause more suffering for those who exist. Furthermore, it's a bit rich to talk about absurd conclusions or reductios when your own worldview says that painfully killing off all life is ethical and that it's better to create a world wherein a few people experience immense harms instead of one where the total amount of harms would be slightly greater, but there would also be a lot of happiness. As for your point regarding heroic tragedies, the efilist might say that this is simply a coping mechanism and being heroic is good only insofar that it prevents greater suffering. As for impositions, I don't see how an act can be an imposition of it doesn't violate the desires of an existing individual who wanted something contrary to what you gave them. However, if creation can be seen as an "imposition" that violates consent, then one could also argue that existence can be a genuine gift, since it allows people to experience goods that they couldn't have asked for prior to their existence.
ReplyDeleteForget about hellish desires, extreme pessimists believe that creating life is bad even if there is a mild desire. If both non-existence and existence are 0 (which is supposedly the best state the latter can achieve), then even -1 is simply unacceptable (unless, of course, you are giving birth to create a new Hitler that would end everything). When talking about people who keep living despite facing hardships, extreme pessimists, who say that they hate paternalistic individuals calling them depressed and therefore irrational (and I would agree that we shouldn't dismiss people's views or force them to live), put forward the argument that most people are simply pretending to like life or are deluded. And whether or not they like life is irrelevant, since non-existence cannot be worse for them.
The extreme pessimist's argument primarily seems to relie upon the claim that happiness doesn't have intrinsic value. It's only instrumentally good because it removes suffering. To me, this doesn't seem plausible. Firstly, let's say that this is indeed true. However, if pleasure and pain are synonymous with value, then a state wherein there is neither (non-existence) cannot be better or worse for someone. But kore importantly, I fail to see why we should accept the claim that happiness doesn't have intrinsic value (but suffering does possess intrinsic disvalue). We could say that suffering is also bad because it prevents us from experiencing a good. Just as eating is good because it removes the harm of hunger, thirst is bad because it removes the good of being satisfied. Fulfillment feels positive, so it does not seem sensible to ignore it. All in all, efilism fails to justify its fundamental claims about the nature of happiness and what can be valuable. This means that their project is, in my view, a recipe for disaster that will ultimately lead to misery and unethical acts. Hopefully, we shall be able to reduce the extent of the damage.
I hope that you have an excellent day/night!
Edit: Spotted a spelling error. It should be "more importantly", not "kore importantly".
DeleteWhat's the context of this comment? Part 2 of what, the July 8, 4:12 comment by Anon? You seem to be arguing on both sides of the issue, so it's hard to disentangle what parts might be directed towards me. Whose worldview, for example, "says that painfully killing off all life is ethical"? Is that supposed to be mine?
DeleteThe arguments you raise here seem to me to get lost in the weeds. It's important not to miss the forest for the trees. My articles on antinatalism and efilism aim to do the opposite, to expose their absurd implications. You don't begin from alleged hedonism (pleasure is good) or utilitarianism (maximization of happiness) and conclude that all life should be terminated (to avoid any trace of suffering)--at least, you don't argue in that way unless you're relying on a raft of confusions and fallacies.
These are not serious philosophical positions, which is why EG seems to carry them on in mere comment sections rather than in articles. In comments on Reddit, etc, you can hide the absurdity of what you're saying because the overall point gets lost in the weeds. It's the same with Inmendham: he gives these long point-by-point replies in hundreds of videos so that the thrust of what he's saying is always lost.
I am sorry if my comment was a bit equivocal or difficult to understand. I am most certainly writing against the efilist view, not yours. This comment was a continuation of my previous comment posted on July 8, 2022 at 4:12 AM. I had to post my reply in two parts because I had exceeded the word limit. Once again, I apologise for the inconvenience.
DeleteI agree that efilism is quite absurd. However, I think that it's better if those who don't think such conclusions are really absurd realise that their worldview is not ethically defensible. The forest is important. Nevertheless, one cannot forget that it was formed by individual trees.
Thanks for taking the time to reply!
I am not sure if my comment made it through, so I am posting another reply.
DeleteYes, it's the second part of that comment. I had to write two comments because I had exceeded the word limit. I am not arguing from their side, but I apologise if I was somewhat unclear with what K said. I was referring to the efilist worldview, not yours.
I think that the trees and the forest matter equally. After all, the individual trees are what ultimately form the forest. I wish to demonstrate that the framework efilists use is contradictory (because it finds value in the absence of suffering in the void but don't find disvalue in the absence of happiness) and limited (because it ignores the reality of happiness).
Some people seem to take it seriously, which is a bit concerning. I hope that we shall be able to avert any major damage resulting from dark ideologies.
Thank you for your reply!
You might find this an interesting read Ben.
ReplyDeletehttps://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bob-black-the-myth-of-human-rights#toc1
"The good life might include some degrees of personal health, wealth, social relationships, freedom to pursue hobbies, living in a civilized, technologically developed society, and so on. Those lives are generally deemed good enough even if they're necessarily not perfect or free from suffering of any kind." I don't disagree with this, but those who do not exist are not in need of any of those things.
ReplyDeleteThey also don't need the absence of life. If "they" do, then creating happiness can also be good.
DeleteA need is a condition or situation in which something must be supplied in order for a certain condition to be maintained or a desired state to be achieved. So I'm not sure the absence of life could qualify as a need.
DeleteMy point was that if creating happiness isn't required because nobody in the void needs it, then neither is there a requirement to never create life, since non-existent beings don't experience satisfaction due to their lack of existence.
DeleteI was responding to the "those who do not exist are not in need of any of those things" point. This seemed to suggest that the positives are only required if there is a prior need. And, since inexistent people do not need happiness, it's absence isn't bad. But if this is true, then I think that one could also say that, even if non-existence isn't bad, it also cannot be good, since nobody in nothingness is satisfied due to their lack of existence. In summary, if the absence of life would only be bad if someone (before being born) needed it, then the absence of life would only be good if it satisfies their desire to avoid existence. In this case, the value of procreation becomes a more individualize matter that differs from situation to situation depending upon the impact it could have on people.
Delete*individualized
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