Most people are harmless but amoral: they don’t go out of
their way to violate anyone’s rights, but their innocence isn’t particularly praiseworthy.
This is because the masses are also unenlightened, meaning that they don’t
think about morality or even realize that a real choice is possible between right and wrong. They lack the power needed to carry out that choice
because they lack a higher self. Their behaviour is governed more by
their emotions, hormones, and trained reflexes than by rational self-control or
by an existential or religious leap of faith, the latter being the means of
controlling our more animalistic side. The masses passively adopt their culture’s
mores and so they’re domesticated, or “civilized,” to use the euphemism.
They’re punished for their misbehavior and so they’re constrained mainly by
fear. Had they an opportunity to benefit themselves at someone else’s expense,
without fear of reprisal, they’d just as soon act out of greed or lust or even contempt
for their victim’s weakness, as they would out of worry under normal
circumstances.
Strictly speaking, the masses are thus more animalistic than
personal. Personhood (or “spirituality,” if you prefer a clichéd term) is quite
rare—even among so-called human beings. The essence of personhood is
self-control and that requires self-knowledge which in turn is the product of
introversion, of a process of rigorous self-exploration ending in the
philosophical realization that we’re ultimately just artists creating ourselves
and our environments merely for the sake of doing so, with no sane hope for a
deeper purpose. We create because we’re natural beings and nature is the undead god, the mindless, inhumane maker of all things. If we’re reflective, we
create ourselves: we add a personal level to our primitive impulses and beta training. We thus gain the
dreadful power of existential choice: we must choose what to be and what to
create; we must take a neo-Kierkegaardian leap of faith in some artistic
vision, in some aesthetic ideal to guide our productive efforts. With
autonomy comes angst, because the freest self is alone in the wilderness of
undead forces, a speck of a tragically heroic mind amidst the wasteland and the
zombie horde.
The human person gains some limited means of self-control
precisely by acquiring self-knowledge: she familiarizes herself with her
temperaments and forms a conceptual system of classifying them which allows her
to manage the more robotic aspects of her inner world. Of course, she lacks
metaphysical freedom, which is the performance of the miracle of opposing a
natural chain of causes and effects, but her intensive self-awareness nevertheless
makes her relatively autonomous. She can screen her impulses because she’s
scrutinized them and she knows where to find them. But that freedom is more of a
curse than a blessing. Her self-knowledge hurls her out of the world and into
the cauldron of existential awareness: her higher self is alienated from
everything else because self-control requires personal detachment. We can
control our lower selves only if we’ve thought hard enough to create a higher, independent
mind that can sometimes act on its own—especially when it confronts our
existential predicament and makes a heroic choice to creatively overcome it. Even
when a person, properly speaking, fails to control herself, by applying her authentic
ideals in her conduct, she can honestly feel guilty on that account, whereas
the guilt of most so-called people is programmed and groundless since they have
little if any capacity for self-control in the first place.
If fear explains why the masses actually simulate morally
right behaviour, why should we be
moral? Should we act in some ways rather than others or is morality just a
delusion? Those who have liberated themselves from natural and social powers
face a foundational choice of what to do, but is one way of being human truly
better than another? Is the difference between right and wrong real? Let’s look
at some conventional answers to these questions.
God and Morality
The oldest answer is that God commands some ways of living
and prohibits others. This theistic basis of morality must be divided into the
polytheistic and monotheistic varieties. True polytheism, which excludes
Hinduism, treats the gods as just very powerful persons who in turn are
identified with what we now know are just natural processes. Thus, ancient
Roman morality, for example, reduced to the fallacies of appealing to authority or to popularity. The idea was that we should behave as commanded by our
favourite god, because we’ve devoted ourselves to that deity. But what
justifies devotion to that god rather than to some other, or to one culture
rather than a foreign one? And how do we know our one god is wise, especially
if the gods’ abilities are supposed to surpass our understanding? Typically,
the ancients followed their local, traditional gods because they were awed by
their power, which was just the power of impersonal natural processes. But attributing
those powers to divine goodness rather than to evil would have been arbitrary.
Perhaps the wisest course for a superhuman being would have been to play with
the lower creatures, namely with us, in which case polytheism provides little
support for morality: following the commandment or the example of a despicable
being would be likewise wrong. Polytheists thus face an acute form of what
skeptical philosophers call the problem of the multiplicity of religions.