At first glance, the nature of objectivity looks
straightforward. Objectivity is the opposite of subjectivity, at least, and
taking a subjective view of something means imposing idiosyncratic, personal,
or somehow noncognitive elements onto the thing itself. So a subjective representation
of a dog, say, would be something like an artistic or otherwise biased statement
that expresses how the speaker feels about dogs rather than how dogs really are,
regardless of anyone’s attitude towards the animal.
But the philosopher Immanuel Kant showed that this intuitive
distinction is incoherent, because even the most so-called unbiased or neutral representation
of something requires some cognitive processing which stands apart from the represented
thing itself. All we can know or understand is the “phenomenon,” Kant said, the
thing as it appears to a creature with our human modes of conceptualization,
not the thing as it is independent of any human or nonhuman form of
understanding. Indeed, as Kant pointed out, even to speak of the “noumenon,” of
how a dog would be even if there were no one else to perceive the dog or to
construe the dog’s nature is empty. Perception,
understanding, and knowledge all presuppose a mental format brought to the matter
by the subject. All cognition, then,
has a subjective element. Kant differed from metaphysical idealists such as
Berkeley, in denying that knowledge is purely subjective. The nonsubjective
part of the world contributes something to the content of our experience. But
instead of thinking of objectivity as the absence of subjectivity, Kant argued
we should reformulate that distinction as one between the universal and the
idiosyncratic. The objective elements of experience are the universal,
“transcendental” ones that speak to our human cognitive conditions, those that
Kant considered the structures of our mind as far as epistemology is concerned.
Emotions of Objectivity
However, I don’t think this is all there is to objectivity
because, contrary to Kant, our conception of the thing in-itself isn’t empty.
Where Kant has it right, I think, is in inferring that the more parochial our
analysis, the more it speaks only to phenomena, to how things seem subjectively
to us. Concepts formulated in natural languages, in particular, are largely
metaphorical and anthropocentric. For example, the concept of “objects” itself
derives from the Latin word, objectus,
which means thrown down towards or thrown down in opposition. Natural
things aren’t literally thrown down by any hand, so that initial conception must
be analogical or archaic. Presumably, the general idea would be that it’s as if
things-as-objects were thrown down before us, because their objective element
is that which we have no choice but to address. To have something literally
thrown at you is to be forced to deal
with it or to have the thing imposed on your perceptual field.
Interestingly, “ob”
in “objectus” can mean towards but it can also mean against, as in the Latin root of
“oppose.” However, this speaks not to an early cosmicist intuition, but
to the role of objectivity in the social practice of disputation. The objective
evidence was thrown down not against the initial observer, but an opponent in
an argument, so the paradigmatic case of objectivity would be that deployed by
the lawyer at trial who dramatically slams the exculpatory piece of evidence on
the table before the astonished jury and opposing counsel. Either way, then,
objectivity was initially conceived in the West as part of human behaviour, as
something done in social interaction, not as whatever speaks more to the
nonhuman side of experience, to things as they are independent of how we’re
built to think of them.
To return, though, to the criticism of Kant, the point is
that if we have in mind anything like that Latin, anthropocentric conception
when we claim we’re being objective in thinking of X, we’re likely dealing only with the makings of a phenomenon in
Kant’s sense. To get at a more universal, transcultural cognitive element, we’d
have to analyze further that practice of throwing down X, to find a more general feature. Notice that such an analysis needn’t
be restricted to issues of semantics, categorization, and logic. As
phenomenologists have subsequently shown, how things seem to us includes an
emotional component which may likewise be idiosyncratic or universal. The real
question of objectivity, then, is whether being objective in capturing the
noumenon could coherently amount to being indifferent
or passive in forming the
representation. Kant’s point would be that the notion of any such attempt is
incoherent. To form a mental representation is to impose some structure onto
the perceived or known thing; otherwise, you’d have just the thing itself, not
any cognitive act or representation.
Laying aside any such claim to neutrality, though, there’s still the potential
for recognizing something’s objective
significance with the fitting emotional response. Here we’re talking
not about the semantic meaning of arid concepts, but a universal value-laden
meaning.