Nietzsche famously challenged these Enlightenment
assumptions, charging that so-called rationality is only a cover for power
struggles. But in the 1940s, the Frankfurt School of social critics went in a
different direction, extending the Marxist criticisms of capitalism to
formulate a comprehensive critique of Western society that included a broadside
against the Enlightenment covenant that reason is progressive. In 1944,
Horkheimer and Adorno published The
Dialectic of Enlightenment (DE), which argued, “Enlightenment, understood
in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating
human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly
enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity.” This calamity of 20th
century totalitarianism is due to the surprising fact that “Myth is already enlightenment,
and enlightenment reverts to mythology.” Instead of progress from an ancient or
medieval state of ignorance and superstition to one of liberty and wisdom,
so-called modernity is structurally continuous with the past, according to
those social critics. Only the styles of delusion and domination have changed.
Adorno and Horkheimer on the Enlightenment
The essence of their criticism of the Enlightenment is
Hegelian and it’s that Enlightenment thinkers mistook the ease of applying
certain methods, such as the abstractions of formal logic and mathematics, for
the discovery of absolute truth, and that by doing so those thinkers mislead us
into presuming that knowledge isn’t always humanized, that is, situated in a
historical, social or psychological context. The reason secular rationality
took this turn was to fulfill “Reason’s old ambition to be purely an instrument
of purposes…The exclusivity of logical laws stems from this obdurate adherence
to function and ultimately from the compulsive character of self-preservation”
(23). In short, the promise of
instrumental reason is that calculation, quantification, and abstract
categorization are means of efficiently achieving our goals, especially our
primary goal of surviving by dominating anything that opposes us, including the
whole of the natural environment as well as other people. Horkheimer would
go on in Eclipse of Reason to distinguish
between subjective and objective reason: the former interprets everything as
means to a presupposed end, and so projects onto the world our preoccupation
with utility. This pragmatic kind of reasoning is anthropocentric and thus
subjective, and the way this occurs in science is through formalization, through
the use of mathematical equations and abstract categories which render the
world calculable. This conceptual machinery is a tool for picking out the
useful aspects of things, namely their causal relations which can be predicted
and exploited. By contrast, objective reason deals with ends rather than means,
by understanding how things fit into a much larger whole that isn’t necessarily
defined by its relation to the ego’s urge to survive.
But in DE, the pair contrasts the Enlightenment’s instrumental
reason with quasi-Hegelian “dialectic” and “determinate negation.” Their point
is that reason needn’t be mistaken for an absolute source of knowledge, but can
be employed more humbly if we attend to how our models “negate” what they’re
about by inevitably leaving much out of the referent. In that case, our models
can’t so easily be used to delude or to oppress us. As DE says, “dialectic
discloses each image as script. [Dialectic] teaches us to read from [the
image’s] features the admission of falseness which cancels [the image’s] power
and hands [the image] over to truth” (18, my clarifications between the square
brackets). This criticism of secular reason is foreshadowed by Kant, since “Philosophical
judgment, according to Kant, aims at the new yet recognizes nothing new, since [that
judgment] always merely repeats what reason has placed into objects beforehand”
(19-20). Kant’s point, too, was that reason allows us to understand only
phenomena as they’re conditioned by our categories and cognitive processes,
never things in themselves which are inevitably left out of the human attempt
to fathom them. (Weird fiction under H.P. Lovecraft would later present the
existential significance of this cognitive humility, which is that the
self-aware, non-deluded knower typically suffers from bouts of horror or
angst.) But Kant pretended that things in themselves are irrelevant and he
celebrated our sovereignty over the humanized world of experience that we
construct in our attempt to understand things. Kant’s philosophy was thus
another step towards secular totalitarianism.