Karl Jaspers’ existential philosophy is similar to Sartre’s,
the main differences being their starting points and styles of writing. The
early Sartre presupposed a literary version of phenomenology as a way of doing
metaphysics, whereas Jaspers starts from science (psychology) and Kantian
philosophy. Both end up with existential conclusions about the need to
persevere despite the ultimate futility of thinking or living, but Jaspers’
psychology background gave objectivity a more prominent role in his philosophy,
which in turn lends even more readily to a cosmicist interpretation of Jaspers.
Jaspers’ Existential Take on Transcendent Knowledge
Karl Jaspers |
Descartes attempted to reestablish the foundation of
philosophy on the bedrock of self-consciousness, but instead of venturing down
the intensely personal, existentialist path—which had to wait until Kierkegaard
(although Saint Augustine’s Confessions
anticipated that development)—he compromised with dogmas, resorting to the
gambit of validating personal experience by appealing to dubious proofs of
God’s existence. David Hume brought the problem of unchained skepticism back
into the philosophical mix, showing that we can’t be sure even about something
as commonsensical as our concept of causality. This prompted Kant to concede
that although metaphysical generalizations are groundless, we can investigate
the transcendental space, as it were, of how our minds would have to be
structured to generate the human form of experience. Analogously, biologists
would later theorize that although the evolution of life is largely accidental,
there is what Daniel Dennett called the “design space” which natural selection
“discovers” and which accounts for convergence in the evolution of certain
traits across species. Physics and chemistry constrain the workable solutions of
evolutionary problems, by providing the possible niches that species can
exploit. For example, there may be a niche for highly intelligent species, in
which case if our mammalian ancestors hadn’t evolved intelligence or
self-consciousness, perhaps a reptile, bird, or mollusk might have done so and
there would have been octopus high-tech cityscapes instead of human ones. There
may, then, be meta-laws about the body-types that will tend to evolve, due to
the niches made possible by lower-level natural regularities.
Kant thus effectively redefined foundational philosophy as
an analysis of the conditions of possible experience. He argued that there are
“transcendental” conditions not of body-types but of forms of experience. For
example, the concepts of space and of time are supposedly fundamental to our
ways of sensing the world, and so while we shouldn’t be confident in generalizations
about the nature of external reality, we can be certain about what Kant called “synthetic
a priori” knowledge, meaning broad
knowledge about ourselves—but specifically about how the human mind must be
structured to generate the universal features of human experience. Kant thus
posited certain categories that determine how we generally process sensory
input, and he maintained that necessary truths that aren’t mere tautologies or
word games apply only to that proto-psychological level of analysis. We do seek
to transcend those limits, such as when we devise speculative ontologies about
God, the immortal soul or the nature of being, but these ideas mislead us if we
think we have direct access to such subject matters. Our knowledge necessarily
passes through our most general modes of understanding and thus we inevitably
project the image of human mentality, as it were, onto any subject of our
inquiry.
Now whereas Kant’s writings were highly technical and
abstract, Jaspers the psychologist-turned-philosopher saw that Kant’s
transcendentalism could be given a more human face or brought further down to
Earth, by delving into what it’s like actually to attempt to transcend the
limits of human experience. While Kant denied that it makes sense even to speak
about the noumenon (the mind-independent source of sensations, or the things in-themselves),
as opposed to things in so far as they’re processed by a type of mind, Jaspers
argued that our insatiable curiosity and our yearning to see our way past
apparent limits give us an experience of transcendence, if not rigorous
knowledge of any such thing. For example, Jaspers mapped out the steps in neo-Hegelian
progress from an empiricist/objective/scientific approach to the world, to an
existentialist/subjective/self-reflective one, to a religious/metaphysical/mystical
outlook. At each stage, we’re confronted with the limits of that approach,
which compels us to raise questions that push us towards the next stage. The empiricist
is faced with the radical doubts voiced classically by such philosophers as
Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, and Nietzsche. We’re forced to look within ourselves
for answers as to how we can trust what we think we know about the external
world. That interior line of inquiry leads us to what would later be called the
postmodern malaise, to relativism, nihilism, or to the self-destructive
solipsism of hyper-consumption—unless we jump yet again to a more encompassing
conceptual framework.