On Medium: What Happens After Philosophy Eats its Tail?
Here's an article about the Liar Paradox, peak subversion in philosophy, Kafkaesque modernity, and how a transhuman sage might conceive of all truths as varieties of fiction.
"What she thought was the simple fact of the world’s agreement with a statement is instead the stuffing of an inhuman, intergalactic monstrosity into the hubristic confines of the human mammalian mentality. And once the philosopher becomes sufficiently jaded, that last, deflationary sentiment won’t seem literally true either."
This made me think that there can be no experience or description of an external world, however objective, that is not dependent, in some form or another, on a sentient being, whatever it is. In our case, it would be our human intellectual and sensibility faculties, and so they set the standard under which the criteria to discriminate between falsity and truth lie (brushing aside all the more obvious anthropomorphism and biases). However, there could be other beings (aliens, A.I. in the far future, etc.) who operate under a completely different set of criteria. On that basis, we could indeed say that they inhabit a different world from ours, and any form of communication between they and us would be impossible.
However, their experience would be dependent on their cognitive faculties, presumably, the same way our experience is dependent on ours. If so, then there can't be a "view from nowhere", because all knowledge would be perspectivist. I can't see any contradiction in the aforementioned statement (no liar's paradox), because it doesn't deny truth, it merely circumscribes it in a particular perspective.
"The view from nowhere" is a somewhat hyperbolic phrase. It can be understood in an absolute or a relative sense. I think the latter one is more useful. So Nagel's point was that objectivity is relative detachment from our personal preoccupations. We can imagine what the world would be like if we'd never personally been born. That is, we can set aside our preferences and focus on the facts that are indifferent to our interests. This objectivity comes from "nowhere" in that it's independent of our personal perspective or personality.
Indeed, as I argue elsewhere, even science, our greatest form of objectivity has a pragmatic, Promethian aspect. Objective knowledge for us is still a matter of humanizing the inhumanity of natural events. So I agree that we shouldn't take "the view from nowhere" literally.
An alien species might have a different collective attitude, culture, or practical approach to knowledge. It depends on the virtues and vices at play, the evolutionary history, the opportunities and temptations the species faces, and so on. At least, that's how we can account for the "progressive humanism" that's implicit in the rise of human civilizations.
After nearly 100 comments, my discussion with micgooflander appears to be over. Just out of curiosity, do you have any general remarks on it? https://youtu.be/ZRVwHUFqwYA
I haven't had a chance to read much of it. It's a long debate. I'll try to read some more of it and present some thoughts on it. Can you summarize the conflict?
It's quite difficult for me to summarise a single page, let alone a 100-comment long (yes, we have hit the century mark) discussion :p
I guess the gist of it was: (note that this is a rather poor paraphrased summary) EG: Suffering is all that matters. If you don't exist/are eliminated, then you wouldn't be concerned about the absence of life.
Me: Your position is arbitrary and unjustified. If the absence of happiness only matters if it leads to a conscious feeling of loss, then the absence of suffering should also only matter if it leads to a conscious sensation of satisfaction.
EG: It's evil to say that preventing torture isn't necessary just because nobody feels relief.
Me: I never said that it's my firm position that absence of torture only matters when there's a sensation of satisfaction. The point is that IF the absence of happiness isn't bad due to a lack of experiential deprivation, then I don't see how the absence of suffering could be good, considering that it benefits nobody. Also, your own view entails the conclusion that a world with infinite love and beauty for billions of sentient beings doesn't have to be created, and in fact, SHOULD NOT be created if someone stubs their toe (since the absence of suffering is all that matters). I don't find this to be a particularly nice conclusion.
There's more, but this is what I thought the heart of the conversation was. Once again, best of luck for 2022!
I tried posting a summary, but I am not sure if it went through. Anyway, I hope that you could see the conversation, particularly the last few comments where EG throws some uncomfortable thought experiments at me, even though he doesn't seem to adequately answer mine.
His thought experiment is the typical one that pops up for utilitarians: Are we willing to sacrifice the minority to please the majority? And his inference is that most of us aren't saints. We're at least somewhat selfish, so the world is fallen and imperfect. There's some unjust suffering and immoral motivation. All of which should be granted.
But the conclusion that we should therefore destroy all life so no one has to experience the imperfection is what's in doubt. Antinatalism and efilism are gross non sequiturs.
Indeed! Additionally, I also pointed out that we don't live in a world where eternal torment exists.
Also, what did you think of my counter thought experiment wherein it would be justified (under negative utilitarianism) to torture a person so that a million potential toe stubbings could be avoided (since suffering is all that matters)?
The very notion of objective truth presupposes a sort of intellectual substrate to the world. Concepts can only correspond to other concepts, so for correspondence theory to be correct, the objects of our perception from which we form our concepts would have to be just as abstract as √-1 in the final analysis. At the very least, the believer in objective truth is committed to metaphysical idealism, if not theism.
I think this is what some of the more sophisticated Christian apologists are eluding to when they say science presupposes the existence of their God. They are wrong about that; but it is true that materialism (which most new atheists subscribe to) has a real problem when it comes to establishing Truth with a capital 'T'. If the universe is mindless & is the product of a mindless process, then nothing we can think about the universe could be 'true' by the strictest definition of that word.
The early Wittgenstein tried to spell out the metaphysics needed to support the correspondence theory of truth, and it ended up being a mystical picture theory of logic. It's a very good question whether true objectivity implies metaphysical idealism. But that kind of truth would be subjective after all. It would be a kind of self-knowledge. I've been reading a lot of Algis Uzdavinys on neoplatonism and his comparative view of the perennial tradition, and he's all over this stuff.
Indeed, theists can sniff out any problem with philosophical naturalism and insert God to "solve" it. One thing we can count on, though, is that the theistic answer is always more foolish even than a flawed naturalistic attempt at a real answer.
"What she thought was the simple fact of the world’s agreement with a statement is instead the stuffing of an inhuman, intergalactic monstrosity into the hubristic confines of the human mammalian mentality. And once the philosopher becomes sufficiently jaded, that last, deflationary sentiment won’t seem literally true either."
ReplyDeleteThis made me think that there can be no experience or description of an external world, however objective, that is not dependent, in some form or another, on a sentient being, whatever it is. In our case, it would be our human intellectual and sensibility faculties, and so they set the standard under which the criteria to discriminate between falsity and truth lie (brushing aside all the more obvious anthropomorphism and biases). However, there could be other beings (aliens, A.I. in the far future, etc.) who operate under a completely different set of criteria. On that basis, we could indeed say that they inhabit a different world from ours, and any form of communication between they and us would be impossible.
However, their experience would be dependent on their cognitive faculties, presumably, the same way our experience is dependent on ours. If so, then there can't be a "view from nowhere", because all knowledge would be perspectivist. I can't see any contradiction in the aforementioned statement (no liar's paradox), because it doesn't deny truth, it merely circumscribes it in a particular perspective.
"The view from nowhere" is a somewhat hyperbolic phrase. It can be understood in an absolute or a relative sense. I think the latter one is more useful. So Nagel's point was that objectivity is relative detachment from our personal preoccupations. We can imagine what the world would be like if we'd never personally been born. That is, we can set aside our preferences and focus on the facts that are indifferent to our interests. This objectivity comes from "nowhere" in that it's independent of our personal perspective or personality.
DeleteIndeed, as I argue elsewhere, even science, our greatest form of objectivity has a pragmatic, Promethian aspect. Objective knowledge for us is still a matter of humanizing the inhumanity of natural events. So I agree that we shouldn't take "the view from nowhere" literally.
An alien species might have a different collective attitude, culture, or practical approach to knowledge. It depends on the virtues and vices at play, the evolutionary history, the opportunities and temptations the species faces, and so on. At least, that's how we can account for the "progressive humanism" that's implicit in the rise of human civilizations.
After nearly 100 comments, my discussion with micgooflander appears to be over. Just out of curiosity, do you have any general remarks on it?
ReplyDeletehttps://youtu.be/ZRVwHUFqwYA
I haven't had a chance to read much of it. It's a long debate. I'll try to read some more of it and present some thoughts on it. Can you summarize the conflict?
DeleteIt's quite difficult for me to summarise a single page, let alone a 100-comment long (yes, we have hit the century mark) discussion :p
DeleteI guess the gist of it was:
(note that this is a rather poor paraphrased summary)
EG: Suffering is all that matters. If you don't exist/are eliminated, then you wouldn't be concerned about the absence of life.
Me: Your position is arbitrary and unjustified. If the absence of happiness only matters if it leads to a conscious feeling of loss, then the absence of suffering should also only matter if it leads to a conscious sensation of satisfaction.
EG: It's evil to say that preventing torture isn't necessary just because nobody feels relief.
Me: I never said that it's my firm position that absence of torture only matters when there's a sensation of satisfaction. The point is that IF the absence of happiness isn't bad due to a lack of experiential deprivation, then I don't see how the absence of suffering could be good, considering that it benefits nobody. Also, your own view entails the conclusion that a world with infinite love and beauty for billions of sentient beings doesn't have to be created, and in fact, SHOULD NOT be created if someone stubs their toe (since the absence of suffering is all that matters). I don't find this to be a particularly nice conclusion.
There's more, but this is what I thought the heart of the conversation was. Once again, best of luck for 2022!
I tried posting a summary, but I am not sure if it went through. Anyway, I hope that you could see the conversation, particularly the last few comments where EG throws some uncomfortable thought experiments at me, even though he doesn't seem to adequately answer mine.
DeleteHis thought experiment is the typical one that pops up for utilitarians: Are we willing to sacrifice the minority to please the majority? And his inference is that most of us aren't saints. We're at least somewhat selfish, so the world is fallen and imperfect. There's some unjust suffering and immoral motivation. All of which should be granted.
DeleteBut the conclusion that we should therefore destroy all life so no one has to experience the imperfection is what's in doubt. Antinatalism and efilism are gross non sequiturs.
Happy new year!
Indeed! Additionally, I also pointed out that we don't live in a world where eternal torment exists.
DeleteAlso, what did you think of my counter thought experiment wherein it would be justified (under negative utilitarianism) to torture a person so that a million potential toe stubbings could be avoided (since suffering is all that matters)?
Thanks!
Interesting article.
ReplyDeleteThe very notion of objective truth presupposes a sort of intellectual substrate to the world. Concepts can only correspond to other concepts, so for correspondence theory to be correct, the objects of our perception from which we form our concepts would have to be just as abstract as √-1 in the final analysis. At the very least, the believer in objective truth is committed to metaphysical idealism, if not theism.
I think this is what some of the more sophisticated Christian apologists are eluding to when they say science presupposes the existence of their God. They are wrong about that; but it is true that materialism (which most new atheists subscribe to) has a real problem when it comes to establishing Truth with a capital 'T'. If the universe is mindless & is the product of a mindless process, then nothing we can think about the universe could be 'true' by the strictest definition of that word.
The early Wittgenstein tried to spell out the metaphysics needed to support the correspondence theory of truth, and it ended up being a mystical picture theory of logic. It's a very good question whether true objectivity implies metaphysical idealism. But that kind of truth would be subjective after all. It would be a kind of self-knowledge. I've been reading a lot of Algis Uzdavinys on neoplatonism and his comparative view of the perennial tradition, and he's all over this stuff.
DeleteIndeed, theists can sniff out any problem with philosophical naturalism and insert God to "solve" it. One thing we can count on, though, is that the theistic answer is always more foolish even than a flawed naturalistic attempt at a real answer.