"But as I explain elsewhere, that kind of proof is irrelevant in determining whether something exists in the real world. We must be content with playing the odds based on induction, and with accepting something’s existence as probable at best, because the real world isn’t game-like. We don’t get to stipulate the rules that nature has to live by, so when confronting nature, we’re in no position to reach for the definitive judgments we’re used to making when playing games like chess or when we’re reading a novel."
I think this argument forgets the role causal interactions play in our perceptions. To say something exists means that said thing is in a causal connection with our cognitive and perceptual apparatus. Since causality is the 'sine qua non' of experience, asking for proof of the existence of something is not really comparable to an arbitrary requirement or a consensual law. We're asking for the cause of that particular perception, or even error in perception, which, in turn, is the ground of said perception or error.
To doubt this would be like doubting causality itself, which would be nonsensical, since doubt and scepticism presuppose causality, as when, for example, one doubts whether the moon is really the cause of moonlight, or if it's raining because the gods willed it so, etc. etc.
Of course, we can't know a priori everything that exists, but what we can know for sure is that if something does exist, then that means a causal relation is taking place between the thing and us, and between it and other things. And so, to ascribe existence to some entity is very different from positing a probable/possible existence. The former is displaying a causal relation, while the latter is merely stating in an abstract manner that such a relation could be happening.
Consequently, the demand to prove the existence of something rests on the logical difference expressed above, and is not an idle requirement or a merely consensual requisite like the rules of a game or the rules of a courtroom.
There is indeed causal necessity in nature, but there are different kinds of necessity. Rationalists like Descartes mixed up logical or mathematical necessity with the natural kind. As David Hume showed in his analysis of induction, causal "necessity" is probabilistic after all in that it rests on a psychological component (habit or presumption that the future will be like the past). That presumption isn't itself necessary (unless you go Kant's way, which equates transcendental necessity with human universality), so the causal relations we posit are generalizations that range beyond what's strictly observed. In short, causal relations in nature are pragmatically posited and aren't like the stipulated, game-like necessities of deduction or of math.
We just have to be clear how we're defining our terms here.
I mean causality when applied to nature (I'm not referring to other types of necessity), in its broadest, 'trascendental', sense. Notice that when understood this way, not just in a mechanistic, 'newtonian', sense, causality really is the basis for the existence of something.
We don't arrive at causality by means of induction, rather, induction is only possible by our brain's ability to link disparate sense data (this is what I mean by causality).
Indeed, induction and abduction are probabilistic modes of reasoning based on the tendency to assume familiar causes to known effects, but, evidently, such modes already presuppose causality (for the simple fact of thinking in terms of causes and effects in the first place), which means that it is known a priori. And so, this is the surest way to determine whether something really exists in nature, or if it's just imagined or a mental abstraction.
We may call causality a rule if we wish, but we'd have to bear in mind that it is a special ('trascendental' to use the kantian jargon) kind of rule. More fundamental than any consensual rule we've invented, because it basically refers to a brain function whose absence would impede empirical knowledge itself.
I agree that we think in causal terms, but what does that have to do with establishing whether something exists in nature? Causality is about the relation between types. My point in the article is that proof is similarly about the relation between "ideas" (in math, games, and the like).
By contrast, accepting that something exists beyond the mind is a matter of wrapping the mind around what Kant called the noumenon, the thing in itself which isn't likely human. There's bound to be some fudging, distortion, or oversimplification going on when human categories are imposed on inhuman, indifferent, alien nature. Talk of "proof" here assumes that nature is a game, and we're pieces moving around according to artificial rules. Indeed, this talk begs the question in theism's favour in a Leibnizian or otherwise rationalist manner.
"...but what does that have to do with establishing whether something exists in nature?"
To say that something exists in nature (for us) basically means that our sense organs were stimulated by signals which are then interpreted by the brain. This, in itself, is a causal process. And so, in an empirical, physiological, way, one can considerer causality as a brain function whose main task is to construct an empirical, external, object from sense stimuli. In short, to posit that an object has such and such qualities, such position, in such a time, etc. is only possible thanks to this function. Of course, causality can also be applied in other domains, such as maths or logic, in an abstract way.
"By contrast, accepting that something exists beyond the mind is a matter of wrapping the mind around what Kant called the noumenon, the thing in itself which isn't likely human"
By definition, such a thing (the noumenon, the thing in itself) cannot be in a causal relation with our sense apparatus, and so, it wouldn't be a 'thing' at all. This is tantamount to say (again, for us, as human beings) that it doesn't exist. The same thing applies to anything "transcendent" i.e. god and other supernatural entities (the mere concept of a 'supernatural entity' is, at bottom, a contradictio in adjecto).
"There's bound to be some fudging, distortion, or oversimplification going on when human categories are imposed on inhuman, indifferent, alien nature."
I agree.
"Talk of "proof" here assumes that nature is a game, and we're pieces moving around according to artificial rules."
If by "proof" we mean: "the statement describes a state of affairs which is consistent with our unbiased observation" (eg: 'the earth is round'), then we can say that said statement ultimately rests on causality, understood as a cognitive and physiological process (a brain function). Again, we can call this a rule if we like, but I think it would be misleading, for the majority of rules are arbitrary and consensual, whereas causality is fundamental and universal for experience.
"Indeed, this talk begs the question in theism's favour in a Leibnizian or otherwise rationalist manner."
The rationalist's mistake was to take causality and give it a transcendent use, not realising that by its very nature, causality can only have an immanent use ('transcendental' to invoke Kant's terminology). We cannot use causality to establish a first cause or to justify an intelligent design, because that would take us out of the world, which, at the end, means out of causality, for it is causality (understood, again, as a physiological process) which makes the external world possible in the first place.
It's perception that depends on causality, not the knowledge of what exists, unless you're assuming something like positivist verificationism. We can't perceive something unless it makes direct or indirect contact with our sense organs. But we can know, as in justifiably affirm that certain things even though we've never perceived them or they're outside our light cone.
Granted, that opens up the possibility of gods, ghosts, and so on. But there are lots of critical thinking grounds on which to reject those possibilities without ending up in solipsism. Verificationism is too blunt an instrument. It ends up hitting you in the head.
"...But we can know, as in justifiably affirm that certain things even though we've never perceived them or they're outside our light cone".
True, but the artificial systems we use to increase our knowledge of the external world rely on sensors and processors analogous to the role our perceptual and sensory apparatus play in cognition.
Therefore, in such systems, causality is applied all the same, not on a physiological way as in our case, but in a techno-artificial one. The causal sequence would be something like: input → processing → output. The criteria to establish that something exists, therefore, is perfectly analogous to the human case.
"But there are lots of critical thinking grounds on which to reject those possibilities without ending up in solipsism. Verificationism is too blunt an instrument. It ends up hitting you in the head."
Our cognitive functions (by which I basically mean our senses and our brain) are fundamentally the same for everyone (discounting instances where the level of intelligence may be lower, as in the case of Down's syndrome), so the results of such functions are universal (fortunately) in the same way mathematics or logic can be universal, which, at least, are not subjected to things like personal preferences, political affiliations, or the like. On this ground, I think we can safely avoid solipsism. When it comes to Verificationism, I agree that it's a blunt instrument, however, I think the question whether something exists or not, when stripped of any metaphysical ambiguities, is a 'blunt' question, so to speak. So it's a kind of 'tit for tat' methodology to answer such a question.
I’d just like to return us to what brought up this talk of causality. Originally, you equated perception with the knowledge that something exists, when you said:
“I think this argument forgets the role causal interactions play in our perceptions. To say something exists means that said thing is in a causal connection with our cognitive and perceptual apparatus. Since causality is the 'sine qua non' of experience, asking for proof of the existence of something is not really comparable to an arbitrary requirement or a consensual law. We're asking for the cause of that particular perception...”
First, then, you started talking about “perceptions.” You said that to say something exists “means” the same as saying it’s causally related to our senses. This is an extreme form of empiricism. It’s basically the positivist’s verificationism which isn’t much defended anymore. But whatever the status of that, this point about causality doesn’t seem relevant to my article’s point about the irrelevance of game-like proof to judgments about what exists.
My point in your quotation of the article was that our interactions with nature aren’t game-like, so the standard of proof, as in the stipulated necessities of the formal, artificial interactions in chess and mathematics is irrelevant. The interactions with nature would certainly include perception and reasoning about perceptions. So I was open to empiricism and to rationalism. Obviously, if no event happens without a cause, no instance of affirming that something exists is uncaused. The cause might be the stimulus, as in perception, or it might be a former state of mind, as in the act of reflecting on what’s in the world.
So the event of instantiating knowledge of something’s existence is surely caused by something. But the question of whether proof is the right standard to bring to bear is about how the affirmation is supposed to be epistemically justified. The justification for saying that something exists isn’t necessarily the same as the cause of the mental state that affirms that the thing exists. Yes, perception provides evidence, but we also must think about what we perceive to categorize and to understand what we’re talking about. And there are rules for thinking properly. But I think those rules of critical thinking are more pragmatic than game-like, so thinking of them as providing proofs is an oversimplification.
"...But whatever the status of that, this point about causality doesn’t seem relevant to my article’s point about the irrelevance of game-like proof to judgments about what exists."
My point was to emphasize the causal connections which are subjacent in every assertoric (material) judgement of modal logic (I first mentioned this in a comment to a previous article, not this one). This prevalence of causality indicates that, rather than being a result of empirical enquiry, is what makes such enquiry possible in the first place. So I'd say my views are more aligned with idealism than empiricism, however I'm not denying the results or validity of scientific discourse. I think both philosophical perspectives are valid on their own right.
On the basis that causality is a condition for experience (what makes it possible), it would be more 'hierarchical' than a simple game-like rule, it would be the universal and fundamental standard to determine what means for something to exist. I think the whole discussion revolves around this.
"...our interactions with nature aren’t game-like, so the standard of proof, as in the stipulated necessities of the formal, artificial interactions in chess and mathematics is irrelevant".
But that's the thing. When we demand for material evidence to a particular assertion, we're asking for what the empirical ground to that assertion is, and that rests on causality as a universal standard. So asking for proof is not really comparable to an arbitrary rule like "white goes first". If it was, then everyone could be living in his own private reality with its own set of rules. I could say something like: "the moon is made out of cheese" and if someone were to reply: "what's your evidence of that?" I could simply retort: "I don't need any evidence. I don't follow such a rule".
"Obviously, if no event happens without a cause, no instance of affirming that something exists is uncaused."
Exactly. I'm merely adding that the obviousness of such assertion shows that is not the result of contingent empirical knowledge, rather, as Kant put it, must be a condition for experience (a "pure concept" in his jargon), as I said above. I can't think on any stronger standard than this when it comes to determine the existence of something.
"The justification for saying that something exists isn’t necessarily the same as the cause of the mental state that affirms that the thing exists."
I think this is somewhat ambiguous. Certainly, I can imagine that something is out there when it's not the case, or I could jump to conclusions based on some faulty perceptions, but to unequivocally say that something happened or is "out there" is justified through a causal process.
"But I think those rules of critical thinking are more pragmatic than game-like, so thinking of them as providing proofs is an oversimplification."
I'm fine with this. I just think we can complement this view with a stronger standard (causality). Because, on the pragmatic angle, a religious person might reply with the bard's immortal phrase: "There are more things in heaven and earth that are dreamt of in your philosophy", by which I mean that a pragmatic view is more limited. If we press on the causal aspect, however, the last word would be ours, namely, "affirmanti incumbit probatio" (the burden of proof). And this exigency would rest on the condition for experience itself, no less.
Empiricism tends to turn into metaphysical idealism, which is what happened to Bishop Berkeley. But if you're coming at this from a Kantian perspective, there is indeed a game-like aspect to his appeal to cognitive rules or forms.
You say, "When we demand for material evidence to a particular assertion, we're asking for what the empirical ground to that assertion is, and that rests on causality as a universal standard."
But the empirical ground is noumenal, so there are no known rules that transfer that sensory content to our mind for processing. We enter the dark with our flashlight (with forms of experience which are the subjects of synthetic a priori knowledge), and we impose that light onto the darkness. The rules or "standards" are in our head, for Kant.
My point about proof, then, is that proof is available only for artificial domains since proof is derived from the application of stipulated or inescapable rules. Thus, if you want to know whether a certain move in chess or baseball is legal, you consult the rule book and there's no dispute left to have (unless the rules are unclear, which allows lawyerly types to fight over that meta level).
Kant wants to extend the artificial domain to all phenomena, to the world as it's understood by our kind. I reduce those transcendental conditions of possible experience to the pragmatic context of tools we exercise, to tools that may or may not work. I mean that I put a pragmatic spin on Kant.
Either way, it's a category mistake to say that our knowledge of nature is as necessary as the correct answers you get when playing a game or when exploring the consequences of math. That was my point here, and your point about the importance of causality would be relevant only if you treated that standard in the rationalist manner which borders on the theistic.
You'd have to turn the universe into an artificial domain or a game. The laws of nature would be prescriptive rules, and their consequences would be necessary moves in a predetermined game. Only then would it make sense to ask for proof of whether something is real in nature. Assuming we don't need that metaphysical narrative, we're left with pragmatic tinkering and probabilistic reasoning.
..."But the empirical ground is noumenal, so there are no known rules that transfer that sensory content to our mind for processing".
I guess you can say I'm coming from an idealist/critical realism perspective. I believe there's great truths in the works of Kant, however, on this particular issue, I can't follow his reasoning. That is to say that I can't consider, as he did, the noumenon as an empirical ground or as the cause of our perceptions. What I'm proposing would be closer to a schopenhauerian type of idealism (if that's actually a thing) where our cognitive faculties construct a phenomenon out of external stimuli. I'm stressing the causal aspect of that process.
"...and we impose that light onto the darkness. The rules or "standards" are in our head, for Kant."
I completely agree with this part. But precisely because we can impose light on that darkness, such "darkness" is always in relation to us (is even "darkness" because of us) and so is not really a noumenon, because that would be nothing at all (for us).
If the rules are in our head, then they're not consensual or arbitrary I take it, but rather they're a fundamental part of our cognition (that's what I meant when I said causality is more "hierarchical" than any other rule. I'm aware that Kant put causality along with eleven other categories in his system, however, I'm referring only to causality in this discussion.)
"I reduce those transcendental conditions of possible experience to the pragmatic context of tools we exercise, to tools that may or may not work. I mean that I put a pragmatic spin on Kant."
I think this is completely feasible. I'd add that there would be a rule, namely, causality, which would operate in a more fundamental or "invariant" way. Because it seems, if I'm understanding the word 'pragmatic' well enough, that a pragmatic rule would be subject to change, revision, historical or psychological perspectives, and so on. It would thus be variant and more circumscribed, whereas causality would remain invariant and universal. But that aside, a pragmatic view is completely compatible with an idealist perspective, I think.
"Either way, it's a category mistake to say that our knowledge of nature is as necessary as the correct answers you get when playing a game or when exploring the consequences of math..."
I completely agree. I think I understand more where you're coming from. Indeed, an empirical enquiry is nothing like the dispute over the rules of a game, because the empirical knowledge we gain is a posteriori, whereas in the game example we can know the rules or "laws" in advance. My point about causality was not to play the rationalist's game though, but to stress this faculty as a sort of standard for empirical inquiry to avoid irrational skepticism and/or metaphysical, theistic, statements. Or, more precisely, to underline the fundamental reason why such statements are not valid.
"...Only then would it make sense to ask for proof of whether something is real in nature. Assuming we don't need that metaphysical narrative, we're left with pragmatic tinkering and probabilistic reasoning."
I think this is a bit of a non sequitur, because it assumes that we can only talk of proof on the realm of consensual domains. Maybe we're falling in a language's trap, as when we talk of natural "laws", but I think there's definitely a ground for certain empirical statements which can function as their "proof". Otherwise, no kind of empirical reasoning (inductive, probabilistic, or otherwise) would be valid. On what grounds could we, for example, say that event 'x' is likelier than event 'y' if there's nothing real in nature to begin with?
I agree, of course, that there are rational standards. There are the systems of formal logic and the principles of critical thinking. The question at issue is whether those standards are game-like so that the inferences amount to proofs in the most strict sense. In the pragmatic, scientific context, the inferences are tentative because God doesn't hand us those principles and standards. They're tools or adaptations we try out to see how well they work, with no guarantee of success. Note, for example, how human rationality may end up killing us all because of our "progress," thanks to our shortsighted destruction of the ecosystems.
In other words, the question is whether there's an antagonism between us and the world. In a game, there's no such antagonism because the game is an extension of the designer's mind. The designer is the God of that artificial space, and the players perform roles with it, setting aside their individuality. It's the same for artists and mathematicians who are free to stipulate or to produce whatever they want as creators. Once the rules of the road are set as conventions, the moves within that artificial space are arbitrarily constrained. It becomes illegal to violate them.
If instead there's a conflict between nature and living things, contrary to the Gaia hypothesis, I think pragmatism and humility make more sense. We try our best to humanize the inhuman, to wrap our minds around nature's alien, dehumanizing facts (quantum mechanics, entropy, the astronomical scale of the universe, etc.), but there's no guarantee our best efforts will adequately align with those contents. Hence there's no proof in nature, strictly speaking. There are human oversimplifications and more or less biased representations of the inhuman cosmos.
If we're talking about Schopenhauer's worldview, we're in the realm of the Eastern traditions which tend to affirm the conflict in question, if only between enlightenment and Maya. Everything may be one in the end, in Hinduism and Buddhism, but the attempt to understand reality with concepts is typically wrongheaded.
Schopenhauer wrote philosophically, but there's still a conflict in his view between moral resistance to the sinister will of nature, and being victimized by that will. So the ascetic resistance to nature wouldn't be game-like in that there would be no common gameboard or frame of reference. The hero would be the one who rejects nature's standards and imposes novel ones, as something like a Nietzschean transhuman.
"...The question at issue is whether those standards are game-like so that the inferences amount to proofs in the most strict sense."
I think there are different types of necessity. There's causal necessity (the one we've been discussing) as well as mathematical and logical necessity. If we consent in saying that those types of necessity are game-like, then we'd have to bear in mind that they're a very special kind of game, where the 'rules' are not merely consensual agreements. I'm referring, of course, to the necessary aspect of those activities, where, for instance, in logic, a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or, in causality, a state of affairs produces another (cause and effect). The same thing applies to math. I think it was Hilbert who said that math is a game whose rules are embedded in our very mind (so not your typical game).
If the 'rules' of such games come from our mind, then that means they're embedded in our very own cognitive faculties, the product of thousands of years of evolution most likely, so we needn't posit a supernatural origin to such 'rules' (apart from the fact that any causal explanation, by its very nature, always presupposes a natural framework).
I think this is explained very well, on the topic of Schopenhauer, in his doctoral dissertation 'On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason'.
"...Note, for example, how human rationality may end up killing us all because of our "progress," thanks to our shortsighted destruction of the ecosystems."
I wholeheartedly agree. Our cognitive faculties in no way guarantee that the merry human enterprise is going to end well.
"I think pragmatism and humility make more sense. We try our best to humanize the inhuman, to wrap our minds around nature's alien, dehumanizing facts".
I completely agree again. I'm just appending that for pragmatism to work, it must have a sort of foundation in a more fundamental cognitive function (causality). The alienness of nature remains the same: a vast amount (possibly infinite) of causally interconnected, inhuman, facts. We try our best to take advantage of such 'interconnectedness' through technological applications, but we may end up killing ourselves, and other species, in the process, while nature, indifferent, follows her course.
"...Hence there's no proof in nature, strictly speaking. There are human oversimplifications and more or less biased representations of the inhuman cosmos."
Well, certainly our language is completely arbitrary and the knowledge we have of nature will always be primitive in comparison to an ideal (complete, i.e. unattainable) knowledge of it. However, we use those arbitrary symbols (words, etc.) to refer to things, facts, and the like. These, in turn, would be the referents of those symbols. In this sense, I think we can say they operate as 'proof'. This doesn't make language any less arbitrary or simplistic, but it permits us to discriminate between statements (true, false, rational, irrational...).
But, again, the inhumanity of nature remains. Once, our concepts allowed us to anthropomorphize nature. After the scientific revolution, however, we no longer use language in the same way. We just use it as a tool to refer to things, at least when it comes to describe/explain natural (alien; inhuman) phenomena.
Belief on metaphysics and on extraterrestrial Life is the difference between an illogical and a logical speculation. The first hasnt based on any previous trace of evidence that is possible or likely to be true, while the second one does, based on what we know that exist and by logical assumptions like there is life on Earth and there are billions of planet out there which have favorable characteristics to sustain life so why not. But god and metaphysical world are based on nothing?? That's another way to compare religious belief with another ones which are way more plausible.
I think the bigger point about atheism, even if its name say the opposite, is not denying "god" existence but being skeptical, i mean, very skeptical. Deny something or being skeptical are not the same thing. So if, hypothetically, god is proven to exist it won't be an atheistic defeat at all because the rational skepticism is by what atheism is based on. Atheism is a conclusion as religious belief but both are based on different grounds or roots, the most essential here about this dispute. The search for an objective truth is the fundamental principle and an end of rational skepticism, at priori, no matter the result, while religious belief is a primary manipulation of this process to build a desirable result.
So atheism is the best conclusion we can reach even if many people chose to keep believing in god they should eliminate a good part of their belief system, specially the moralistic myopia they are very likely to engage.
Even before the advances in astronomy it was already possible to be perfectly skeptical about religious belief for the simple fact that there is no single trace of the god's existence.
It is not the same thing that, for example, speculate about the level of heredity of human intelligence if there are patterns that corroborate its veracity.
When theists make statements about their beliefs they are based only on their feelings and nothing else.
Those are some fine points (skepticism and the inhospitality of most of the universe). But emphasizing skepticism might put the atheist in something like the defendant's position (as in a court of law), which raises the question of whether the burden of proof is equal. That's the question I focused on in the article.
The skeptic can doubt whatever he thinks is dubious, but that implies a certain epistemology (beliefs are justified by appealing to logic and to the senses). The skeptic would have the burden to defend that theory of knowledge. The supernaturalist holds out the possibility of other sources of knowledge (revelation, tradition, authority, inner experience).
I'm not sure what you're referring to here. Our bodies are mammalian, but not everyone's mind or character is fully human in the existentialist's sense. Some are awakened to the existential stakes and to the philosophical issues, while others are interested in more animalistic pursuits (succeeding in their evolutionary life cycle, finding a mate, raising a family, flourishing in material terms, and so on).
Most people's lifestyle, then, is ethologically normal, or is comparable to the social animal's. Only the enlightened, more transhuman lifestyle would be anomalous in the animal kingdom and would therefore substantiate the distinction we take for granted between people and animals.
"But as I explain elsewhere, that kind of proof is irrelevant in determining whether something exists in the real world. We must be content with playing the odds based on induction, and with accepting something’s existence as probable at best, because the real world isn’t game-like. We don’t get to stipulate the rules that nature has to live by, so when confronting nature, we’re in no position to reach for the definitive judgments we’re used to making when playing games like chess or when we’re reading a novel."
ReplyDeleteI think this argument forgets the role causal interactions play in our perceptions. To say something exists means that said thing is in a causal connection with our cognitive and perceptual apparatus. Since causality is the 'sine qua non' of experience, asking for proof of the existence of something is not really comparable to an arbitrary requirement or a consensual law. We're asking for the cause of that particular perception, or even error in perception, which, in turn, is the ground of said perception or error.
To doubt this would be like doubting causality itself, which would be nonsensical, since doubt and scepticism presuppose causality, as when, for example, one doubts whether the moon is really the cause of moonlight, or if it's raining because the gods willed it so, etc. etc.
Of course, we can't know a priori everything that exists, but what we can know for sure is that if something does exist, then that means a causal relation is taking place between the thing and us, and between it and other things. And so, to ascribe existence to some entity is very different from positing a probable/possible existence. The former is displaying a causal relation, while the latter is merely stating in an abstract manner that such a relation could be happening.
Consequently, the demand to prove the existence of something rests on the logical difference expressed above, and is not an idle requirement or a merely consensual requisite like the rules of a game or the rules of a courtroom.
Great article, as always.
There is indeed causal necessity in nature, but there are different kinds of necessity. Rationalists like Descartes mixed up logical or mathematical necessity with the natural kind. As David Hume showed in his analysis of induction, causal "necessity" is probabilistic after all in that it rests on a psychological component (habit or presumption that the future will be like the past). That presumption isn't itself necessary (unless you go Kant's way, which equates transcendental necessity with human universality), so the causal relations we posit are generalizations that range beyond what's strictly observed. In short, causal relations in nature are pragmatically posited and aren't like the stipulated, game-like necessities of deduction or of math.
DeleteWe just have to be clear how we're defining our terms here.
I mean causality when applied to nature (I'm not referring to other types of necessity), in its broadest, 'trascendental', sense. Notice that when understood this way, not just in a mechanistic, 'newtonian', sense, causality really is the basis for the existence of something.
DeleteWe don't arrive at causality by means of induction, rather, induction is only possible by our brain's ability to link disparate sense data (this is what I mean by causality).
Indeed, induction and abduction are probabilistic modes of reasoning based on the tendency to assume familiar causes to known effects, but, evidently, such modes already presuppose causality (for the simple fact of thinking in terms of causes and effects in the first place), which means that it is known a priori. And so, this is the surest way to determine whether something really exists in nature, or if it's just imagined or a mental abstraction.
We may call causality a rule if we wish, but we'd have to bear in mind that it is a special ('trascendental' to use the kantian jargon) kind of rule. More fundamental than any consensual rule we've invented, because it basically refers to a brain function whose absence would impede empirical knowledge itself.
I agree that we think in causal terms, but what does that have to do with establishing whether something exists in nature? Causality is about the relation between types. My point in the article is that proof is similarly about the relation between "ideas" (in math, games, and the like).
DeleteBy contrast, accepting that something exists beyond the mind is a matter of wrapping the mind around what Kant called the noumenon, the thing in itself which isn't likely human. There's bound to be some fudging, distortion, or oversimplification going on when human categories are imposed on inhuman, indifferent, alien nature. Talk of "proof" here assumes that nature is a game, and we're pieces moving around according to artificial rules. Indeed, this talk begs the question in theism's favour in a Leibnizian or otherwise rationalist manner.
"...but what does that have to do with establishing whether something exists in nature?"
DeleteTo say that something exists in nature (for us) basically means that our sense organs were stimulated by signals which are then interpreted by the brain. This, in itself, is a causal process. And so, in an empirical, physiological, way, one can considerer causality as a brain function whose main task is to construct an empirical, external, object from sense stimuli. In short, to posit that an object has such and such qualities, such position, in such a time, etc. is only possible thanks to this function. Of course, causality can also be applied in other domains, such as maths or logic, in an abstract way.
"By contrast, accepting that something exists beyond the mind is a matter of wrapping the mind around what Kant called the noumenon, the thing in itself which isn't likely human"
By definition, such a thing (the noumenon, the thing in itself) cannot be in a causal relation with our sense apparatus, and so, it wouldn't be a 'thing' at all. This is tantamount to say (again, for us, as human beings) that it doesn't exist. The same thing applies to anything "transcendent" i.e. god and other supernatural entities (the mere concept of a 'supernatural entity' is, at bottom, a contradictio in adjecto).
"There's bound to be some fudging, distortion, or oversimplification going on when human categories are imposed on inhuman, indifferent, alien nature."
I agree.
"Talk of "proof" here assumes that nature is a game, and we're pieces moving around according to artificial rules."
If by "proof" we mean: "the statement describes a state of affairs which is consistent with our unbiased observation" (eg: 'the earth is round'), then we can say that said statement ultimately rests on causality, understood as a cognitive and physiological process (a brain function). Again, we can call this a rule if we like, but I think it would be misleading, for the majority of rules are arbitrary and consensual, whereas causality is fundamental and universal for experience.
"Indeed, this talk begs the question in theism's favour in a Leibnizian or otherwise rationalist manner."
The rationalist's mistake was to take causality and give it a transcendent use, not realising that by its very nature, causality can only have an immanent use ('transcendental' to invoke Kant's terminology). We cannot use causality to establish a first cause or to justify an intelligent design, because that would take us out of the world, which, at the end, means out of causality, for it is causality (understood, again, as a physiological process) which makes the external world possible in the first place.
It's perception that depends on causality, not the knowledge of what exists, unless you're assuming something like positivist verificationism. We can't perceive something unless it makes direct or indirect contact with our sense organs. But we can know, as in justifiably affirm that certain things even though we've never perceived them or they're outside our light cone.
DeleteGranted, that opens up the possibility of gods, ghosts, and so on. But there are lots of critical thinking grounds on which to reject those possibilities without ending up in solipsism. Verificationism is too blunt an instrument. It ends up hitting you in the head.
"...But we can know, as in justifiably affirm that certain things even though we've never perceived them or they're outside our light cone".
DeleteTrue, but the artificial systems we use to increase our knowledge of the external world rely on sensors and processors analogous to the role our perceptual and sensory apparatus play in cognition.
Therefore, in such systems, causality is applied all the same, not on a physiological way as in our case, but in a techno-artificial one. The causal sequence would be something like: input → processing → output. The criteria to establish that something exists, therefore, is perfectly analogous to the human case.
"But there are lots of critical thinking grounds on which to reject those possibilities without ending up in solipsism. Verificationism is too blunt an instrument. It ends up hitting you in the head."
Our cognitive functions (by which I basically mean our senses and our brain) are fundamentally the same for everyone (discounting instances where the level of intelligence may be lower, as in the case of Down's syndrome), so the results of such functions are universal (fortunately) in the same way mathematics or logic can be universal, which, at least, are not subjected to things like personal preferences, political affiliations, or the like. On this ground, I think we can safely avoid solipsism. When it comes to Verificationism, I agree that it's a blunt instrument, however, I think the question whether something exists or not, when stripped of any metaphysical ambiguities, is a 'blunt' question, so to speak. So it's a kind of 'tit for tat' methodology to answer such a question.
I’d just like to return us to what brought up this talk of causality. Originally, you equated perception with the knowledge that something exists, when you said:
Delete“I think this argument forgets the role causal interactions play in our perceptions. To say something exists means that said thing is in a causal connection with our cognitive and perceptual apparatus. Since causality is the 'sine qua non' of experience, asking for proof of the existence of something is not really comparable to an arbitrary requirement or a consensual law. We're asking for the cause of that particular perception...”
First, then, you started talking about “perceptions.” You said that to say something exists “means” the same as saying it’s causally related to our senses. This is an extreme form of empiricism. It’s basically the positivist’s verificationism which isn’t much defended anymore. But whatever the status of that, this point about causality doesn’t seem relevant to my article’s point about the irrelevance of game-like proof to judgments about what exists.
My point in your quotation of the article was that our interactions with nature aren’t game-like, so the standard of proof, as in the stipulated necessities of the formal, artificial interactions in chess and mathematics is irrelevant. The interactions with nature would certainly include perception and reasoning about perceptions. So I was open to empiricism and to rationalism. Obviously, if no event happens without a cause, no instance of affirming that something exists is uncaused. The cause might be the stimulus, as in perception, or it might be a former state of mind, as in the act of reflecting on what’s in the world.
So the event of instantiating knowledge of something’s existence is surely caused by something. But the question of whether proof is the right standard to bring to bear is about how the affirmation is supposed to be epistemically justified. The justification for saying that something exists isn’t necessarily the same as the cause of the mental state that affirms that the thing exists. Yes, perception provides evidence, but we also must think about what we perceive to categorize and to understand what we’re talking about. And there are rules for thinking properly. But I think those rules of critical thinking are more pragmatic than game-like, so thinking of them as providing proofs is an oversimplification.
"...But whatever the status of that, this point about causality doesn’t seem relevant to my article’s point about the irrelevance of game-like proof to judgments about what exists."
DeleteMy point was to emphasize the causal connections which are subjacent in every assertoric (material) judgement of modal logic (I first mentioned this in a comment to a previous article, not this one). This prevalence of causality indicates that, rather than being a result of empirical enquiry, is what makes such enquiry possible in the first place. So I'd say my views are more aligned with idealism than empiricism, however I'm not denying the results or validity of scientific discourse. I think both philosophical perspectives are valid on their own right.
On the basis that causality is a condition for experience (what makes it possible), it would be more 'hierarchical' than a simple game-like rule, it would be the universal and fundamental standard to determine what means for something to exist. I think the whole discussion revolves around this.
"...our interactions with nature aren’t game-like, so the standard of proof, as in the stipulated necessities of the formal, artificial interactions in chess and mathematics is irrelevant".
But that's the thing. When we demand for material evidence to a particular assertion, we're asking for what the empirical ground to that assertion is, and that rests on causality as a universal standard. So asking for proof is not really comparable to an arbitrary rule like "white goes first". If it was, then everyone could be living in his own private reality with its own set of rules. I could say something like: "the moon is made out of cheese" and if someone were to reply: "what's your evidence of that?" I could simply retort: "I don't need any evidence. I don't follow such a rule".
"Obviously, if no event happens without a cause, no instance of affirming that something exists is uncaused."
Exactly. I'm merely adding that the obviousness of such assertion shows that is not the result of contingent empirical knowledge, rather, as Kant put it, must be a condition for experience (a "pure concept" in his jargon), as I said above. I can't think on any stronger standard than this when it comes to determine the existence of something.
"The justification for saying that something exists isn’t necessarily the same as the cause of the mental state that affirms that the thing exists."
I think this is somewhat ambiguous. Certainly, I can imagine that something is out there when it's not the case, or I could jump to conclusions based on some faulty perceptions, but to unequivocally say that something happened or is "out there" is justified through a causal process.
"But I think those rules of critical thinking are more pragmatic than game-like, so thinking of them as providing proofs is an oversimplification."
I'm fine with this. I just think we can complement this view with a stronger standard (causality). Because, on the pragmatic angle, a religious person might reply with the bard's immortal phrase: "There are more things in heaven and earth that are dreamt of in your philosophy", by which I mean that a pragmatic view is more limited. If we press on the causal aspect, however, the last word would be ours, namely, "affirmanti incumbit probatio" (the burden of proof). And this exigency would rest on the condition for experience itself, no less.
Empiricism tends to turn into metaphysical idealism, which is what happened to Bishop Berkeley. But if you're coming at this from a Kantian perspective, there is indeed a game-like aspect to his appeal to cognitive rules or forms.
DeleteYou say, "When we demand for material evidence to a particular assertion, we're asking for what the empirical ground to that assertion is, and that rests on causality as a universal standard."
But the empirical ground is noumenal, so there are no known rules that transfer that sensory content to our mind for processing. We enter the dark with our flashlight (with forms of experience which are the subjects of synthetic a priori knowledge), and we impose that light onto the darkness. The rules or "standards" are in our head, for Kant.
My point about proof, then, is that proof is available only for artificial domains since proof is derived from the application of stipulated or inescapable rules. Thus, if you want to know whether a certain move in chess or baseball is legal, you consult the rule book and there's no dispute left to have (unless the rules are unclear, which allows lawyerly types to fight over that meta level).
Kant wants to extend the artificial domain to all phenomena, to the world as it's understood by our kind. I reduce those transcendental conditions of possible experience to the pragmatic context of tools we exercise, to tools that may or may not work. I mean that I put a pragmatic spin on Kant.
Either way, it's a category mistake to say that our knowledge of nature is as necessary as the correct answers you get when playing a game or when exploring the consequences of math. That was my point here, and your point about the importance of causality would be relevant only if you treated that standard in the rationalist manner which borders on the theistic.
You'd have to turn the universe into an artificial domain or a game. The laws of nature would be prescriptive rules, and their consequences would be necessary moves in a predetermined game. Only then would it make sense to ask for proof of whether something is real in nature. Assuming we don't need that metaphysical narrative, we're left with pragmatic tinkering and probabilistic reasoning.
..."But the empirical ground is noumenal, so there are no known rules that transfer that sensory content to our mind for processing".
DeleteI guess you can say I'm coming from an idealist/critical realism perspective. I believe there's great truths in the works of Kant, however, on this particular issue, I can't follow his reasoning. That is to say that I can't consider, as he did, the noumenon as an empirical ground or as the cause of our perceptions. What I'm proposing would be closer to a schopenhauerian type of idealism (if that's actually a thing) where our cognitive faculties construct a phenomenon out of external stimuli. I'm stressing the causal aspect of that process.
"...and we impose that light onto the darkness. The rules or "standards" are in our head, for Kant."
I completely agree with this part. But precisely because we can impose light on that darkness, such "darkness" is always in relation to us (is even "darkness" because of us) and so is not really a noumenon, because that would be nothing at all (for us).
If the rules are in our head, then they're not consensual or arbitrary I take it, but rather they're a fundamental part of our cognition (that's what I meant when I said causality is more "hierarchical" than any other rule. I'm aware that Kant put causality along with eleven other categories in his system, however, I'm referring only to causality in this discussion.)
"I reduce those transcendental conditions of possible experience to the pragmatic context of tools we exercise, to tools that may or may not work. I mean that I put a pragmatic spin on Kant."
I think this is completely feasible. I'd add that there would be a rule, namely, causality, which would operate in a more fundamental or "invariant" way. Because it seems, if I'm understanding the word 'pragmatic' well enough, that a pragmatic rule would be subject to change, revision, historical or psychological perspectives, and so on. It would thus be variant and more circumscribed, whereas causality would remain invariant and universal. But that aside, a pragmatic view is completely compatible with an idealist perspective, I think.
"Either way, it's a category mistake to say that our knowledge of nature is as necessary as the correct answers you get when playing a game or when exploring the consequences of math..."
I completely agree. I think I understand more where you're coming from. Indeed, an empirical enquiry is nothing like the dispute over the rules of a game, because the empirical knowledge we gain is a posteriori, whereas in the game example we can know the rules or "laws" in advance. My point about causality was not to play the rationalist's game though, but to stress this faculty as a sort of standard for empirical inquiry to avoid irrational skepticism and/or metaphysical, theistic, statements. Or, more precisely, to underline the fundamental reason why such statements are not valid.
"...Only then would it make sense to ask for proof of whether something is real in nature. Assuming we don't need that metaphysical narrative, we're left with pragmatic tinkering and probabilistic reasoning."
I think this is a bit of a non sequitur, because it assumes that we can only talk of proof on the realm of consensual domains. Maybe we're falling in a language's trap, as when we talk of natural "laws", but I think there's definitely a ground for certain empirical statements which can function as their "proof". Otherwise, no kind of empirical reasoning (inductive, probabilistic, or otherwise) would be valid. On what grounds could we, for example, say that event 'x' is likelier than event 'y' if there's nothing real in nature to begin with?
I agree, of course, that there are rational standards. There are the systems of formal logic and the principles of critical thinking. The question at issue is whether those standards are game-like so that the inferences amount to proofs in the most strict sense. In the pragmatic, scientific context, the inferences are tentative because God doesn't hand us those principles and standards. They're tools or adaptations we try out to see how well they work, with no guarantee of success. Note, for example, how human rationality may end up killing us all because of our "progress," thanks to our shortsighted destruction of the ecosystems.
DeleteIn other words, the question is whether there's an antagonism between us and the world. In a game, there's no such antagonism because the game is an extension of the designer's mind. The designer is the God of that artificial space, and the players perform roles with it, setting aside their individuality. It's the same for artists and mathematicians who are free to stipulate or to produce whatever they want as creators. Once the rules of the road are set as conventions, the moves within that artificial space are arbitrarily constrained. It becomes illegal to violate them.
If instead there's a conflict between nature and living things, contrary to the Gaia hypothesis, I think pragmatism and humility make more sense. We try our best to humanize the inhuman, to wrap our minds around nature's alien, dehumanizing facts (quantum mechanics, entropy, the astronomical scale of the universe, etc.), but there's no guarantee our best efforts will adequately align with those contents. Hence there's no proof in nature, strictly speaking. There are human oversimplifications and more or less biased representations of the inhuman cosmos.
If we're talking about Schopenhauer's worldview, we're in the realm of the Eastern traditions which tend to affirm the conflict in question, if only between enlightenment and Maya. Everything may be one in the end, in Hinduism and Buddhism, but the attempt to understand reality with concepts is typically wrongheaded.
Schopenhauer wrote philosophically, but there's still a conflict in his view between moral resistance to the sinister will of nature, and being victimized by that will. So the ascetic resistance to nature wouldn't be game-like in that there would be no common gameboard or frame of reference. The hero would be the one who rejects nature's standards and imposes novel ones, as something like a Nietzschean transhuman.
"...The question at issue is whether those standards are game-like so that the inferences amount to proofs in the most strict sense."
DeleteI think there are different types of necessity. There's causal necessity (the one we've been discussing) as well as mathematical and logical necessity. If we consent in saying that those types of necessity are game-like, then we'd have to bear in mind that they're a very special kind of game, where the 'rules' are not merely consensual agreements. I'm referring, of course, to the necessary aspect of those activities, where, for instance, in logic, a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or, in causality, a state of affairs produces another (cause and effect). The same thing applies to math. I think it was Hilbert who said that math is a game whose rules are embedded in our very mind (so not your typical game).
If the 'rules' of such games come from our mind, then that means they're embedded in our very own cognitive faculties, the product of thousands of years of evolution most likely, so we needn't posit a supernatural origin to such 'rules' (apart from the fact that any causal explanation, by its very nature, always presupposes a natural framework).
I think this is explained very well, on the topic of Schopenhauer, in his doctoral dissertation 'On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason'.
"...Note, for example, how human rationality may end up killing us all because of our "progress," thanks to our shortsighted destruction of the ecosystems."
I wholeheartedly agree. Our cognitive faculties in no way guarantee that the merry human enterprise is going to end well.
"I think pragmatism and humility make more sense. We try our best to humanize the inhuman, to wrap our minds around nature's alien, dehumanizing facts".
I completely agree again. I'm just appending that for pragmatism to work, it must have a sort of foundation in a more fundamental cognitive function (causality). The alienness of nature remains the same: a vast amount (possibly infinite) of causally interconnected, inhuman, facts. We try our best to take advantage of such 'interconnectedness' through technological applications, but we may end up killing ourselves, and other species, in the process, while nature, indifferent, follows her course.
"...Hence there's no proof in nature, strictly speaking. There are human oversimplifications and more or less biased representations of the inhuman cosmos."
Well, certainly our language is completely arbitrary and the knowledge we have of nature will always be primitive in comparison to an ideal (complete, i.e. unattainable) knowledge of it. However, we use those arbitrary symbols (words, etc.) to refer to things, facts, and the like. These, in turn, would be the referents of those symbols. In this sense, I think we can say they operate as 'proof'. This doesn't make language any less arbitrary or simplistic, but it permits us to discriminate between statements (true, false, rational, irrational...).
But, again, the inhumanity of nature remains. Once, our concepts allowed us to anthropomorphize nature. After the scientific revolution, however, we no longer use language in the same way. We just use it as a tool to refer to things, at least when it comes to describe/explain natural (alien; inhuman) phenomena.
Belief on metaphysics and on extraterrestrial Life is the difference between an illogical and a logical speculation. The first hasnt based on any previous trace of evidence that is possible or likely to be true, while the second one does, based on what we know that exist and by logical assumptions like there is life on Earth and there are billions of planet out there which have favorable characteristics to sustain life so why not. But god and metaphysical world are based on nothing?? That's another way to compare religious belief with another ones which are way more plausible.
ReplyDeleteI think the bigger point about atheism, even if its name say the opposite, is not denying "god" existence but being skeptical, i mean, very skeptical. Deny something or being skeptical are not the same thing. So if, hypothetically, god is proven to exist it won't be an atheistic defeat at all because the rational skepticism is by what atheism is based on. Atheism is a conclusion as religious belief but both are based on different grounds or roots, the most essential here about this dispute. The search for an objective truth is the fundamental principle and an end of rational skepticism, at priori, no matter the result, while religious belief is a primary manipulation of this process to build a desirable result.
ReplyDeleteSo atheism is the best conclusion we can reach even if many people chose to keep believing in god they should eliminate a good part of their belief system, specially the moralistic myopia they are very likely to engage.
Another thought is: if god created the universe then why only the earth that is habitable at least in the solar system and the surroundings?
ReplyDeleteIntelligent design doesn't look very smart thought.
Even before the advances in astronomy it was already possible to be perfectly skeptical about religious belief for the simple fact that there is no single trace of the god's existence.
ReplyDeleteIt is not the same thing that, for example, speculate about the level of heredity of human intelligence if there are patterns that corroborate its veracity.
When theists make statements about their beliefs they are based only on their feelings and nothing else.
Those are some fine points (skepticism and the inhospitality of most of the universe). But emphasizing skepticism might put the atheist in something like the defendant's position (as in a court of law), which raises the question of whether the burden of proof is equal. That's the question I focused on in the article.
DeleteThe skeptic can doubt whatever he thinks is dubious, but that implies a certain epistemology (beliefs are justified by appealing to logic and to the senses). The skeptic would have the burden to defend that theory of knowledge. The supernaturalist holds out the possibility of other sources of knowledge (revelation, tradition, authority, inner experience).
I suggest you take precaution when comparing humans with animals because it can easily slip into speciesist claims.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what you're referring to here. Our bodies are mammalian, but not everyone's mind or character is fully human in the existentialist's sense. Some are awakened to the existential stakes and to the philosophical issues, while others are interested in more animalistic pursuits (succeeding in their evolutionary life cycle, finding a mate, raising a family, flourishing in material terms, and so on).
DeleteMost people's lifestyle, then, is ethologically normal, or is comparable to the social animal's. Only the enlightened, more transhuman lifestyle would be anomalous in the animal kingdom and would therefore substantiate the distinction we take for granted between people and animals.