On Medium: Existential Morality in “Crimes and Misdemeanors”
Read on about how Woody Allen wrestles with God’s absence in a rotten world: the argument from evil, and comic relief from the incel critique of conventional hypocrisy.
Canada's big on red tape. Criminals cut through red tape, so Canada doesn't like criminals. Is whistleblowing criminality? That's the question with Chelsea Manning. It doesn't interest me much.
But of course you're the commenter who continually posts links to anti-Canadian articles on this blog, most of which I delete because they're irrelevant. You seem to think that because I'm harshly critical of American culture, I must be a patriotic Canadian. I'm a naturalist who's into existentialism, cosmicism, and philosophy in general. I aim to see through all nationalist myths, so your childish reminders that Canada is flawed are like drops of water rolling off a duck's back.
I'm not sure if there's a genuine dilemma here. Clifford clearly isn't an alpha like Lester. He might try to get some game & silence whatever conscience he has through drugs & alcohol, but even if he is able to make a long term commitment to a life he's so obviously unsuited for, he'd never be anything more than a pale imitation of Lester. And yet he lacks the moral fortitude & capacity for self-delusion that would allow him to follow his conscience & live a contented life of faith like Saul does. So it's a false dilemma: Clifford might admire both of these men & wish he could be like either one or the other, but in fact he can't & is stuck being Clifford.
Of course, once this dawns on him, his admiration must inevitably deliquesce into envy & hatred. Cliffords only source of consolation then, would be to somehow bring Lester & Saul down to his level by sabotaging their the foundations of their happiness. Ultimately, he would have to become a monster, worse even than Judah: a kind of malign bodhisattva who's devoted his life, not to enlightening others, but to disillusioning them by exposing their evasions, hidden motives & hypocrisy as well as their crimes & misdemeanors -- not just to others -- but to themselves.
Mishima Yukio's Forbidden Colours explores this idea to some degree. The protagonist is an aging, unattractive misogynist who grooms a handsome young homosexual, transforming him into a sort of male femme fatale whom he uses to avenge himself upon the female sex. I actually couldn't finish that novel; it was just too dark even for me.
Regarding the dilemma, I think you're talking about the article's final paragraph:
"Allen’s film is clearer in its presentation of the existential dilemma: Do we surrender our conscience or our intellectual integrity to be happy like Lester or Judah, or do we sacrifice ourselves for what are supposed to be greater philosophical truths, like Clifford?"
So the dilemma's meant to be for us, the movie's viewers, not for Clifford. (Actually, the dilemma's meant to be universal and is therefore for everyone?) Do we give up on our conscience to be happy in a fallen world, or retain our scruples and suffer alienation from that same world?
It's good to have you back, Sybok. I always enjoy reading your comments. They've spurred my thinking a number of times.
I look forward to your every post & have been reading them regularly; but most of the recent ones have been about movies I haven't seen, so I didn't have any thoughts about them to contribute.
I suppose my fatalism was showing in my last comment. I don't believe anyone can change themselves that fundamentally. Alienated idealists really have no chance of becoming amoral pragmatists or vice versa -- at least no examples come to mind. Certainly, there have been plenty of people who've experienced their own personal road to Damascus, but the change they underwent was no more fundamental than that dubious apostle's. Satan can no longer tempt someone who has seen through his tawdry illusions. No one can escape themselves.
Hi, I hope that you have been doing well. I wanted to let you know that a person whom I know well (and completely disagree with, since he's an efilist/promortalist) is launching a blog to advocate for pessimism, efilism, and the right to die (I do agree with this). It's going to be called schopenhaueonmars.com and will become active from today (hopefully). So, it might be an interesting resource for you if you wish to address some pessimistic omnicidal ideas. This person has been advocating for this ideology for years, so he's got a fairly consistent framework (although, I would definitely say that it's flawed, for reasons that I have already mentioned everywhere).
The article rambles, but the author says, "suffering is the only source of value in the universe," and "if one accepts an atheistic and materialistic conception of reality, then there can be no such thing as a good or a bad that is not defined exclusively by the feelings of sentient organisms."
The second statement runs up against the naturalistic fallacy. The feelings of pleasure and pain aren't inherently good or bad, so there's no such "exclusive" definition.
Those feelings are better thought of as signs of what's good or bad. Pleasure tends to go with what's good, and pain with what's bad, but the feelings aren't the essences of goodness or badness. Some people have experienced mostly pleasure in life, but their life has been bad. See, for example, spoiled, decadent rich people. And others, who've mostly sacrificed themselves for a higher goal, have suffered a lot, but their life has been worthy.
If strict "materialism" is supposed to constrain the moral standards, the notions of goodness and badness are only illusions, so who cares how they're defined? There would be just pleasures and pains as physical facts, not as values. All values would be illusory, in which case there would be no urgency to the goal of ending life or of preventing procreation, since none of our actions or mental states would have a real moral standing.
Eliminative materialism would prove too much and would undercut the moral authority of antinatalism. That's just one of the ways this extreme pessimism is incoherent. I believe I pointed that out to Inmendham and never got a direct response.
The rambling structure of that article seems to me telling. What antinatalists need to do is stop dancing around the core issues and just think hard about what they're saying.
" Some people have experienced mostly pleasure in life, but their life has been bad. See, for example, spoiled, decadent rich people." Why would that be bad? Who sets the standard for what's good or bad?
They could be judged bad from a standpoint of non-self-destructive materialism, from a position that posits ideals or goals that aren't determined by physical or chemical processes, but that emerge unpredictably from them.
The goal might be to produce an ideal, artificial world, a heaven on earth, and those who work towards achieving that goal are judged more worthy than those who succumb to materialistic degradations and regressions, such as decadent, self-absorbed hedonists.
Thanks for this amazing reply. It's unfortunate that I forgot to check this, or I would have responded sooner.
I largely agree with you. Antinatalists (particularly efilists) seem keen on boxing people in these narrow labels, like "atheist antinatalism". I guess it's a reflection of their absolutist perspective towards life.
I did have a question regarding the ideals part. I think that the author of that post would argue that the only reason we care about ideals is because they fulfill our needs (and prevent suffering, since they believe all needs are suffering). EG argues that it's an objective fact that sentient beings avoid pain, so the only logical conception of good and bad can come through pain and pleasure (he also argued that this is why we wouldn't be able to explain good and bad to a nonsentient AI). What would be yours response to that?
Personally, I am willing to grant EG, for the sake of the argument, that pleasure and pain constitute good and bad. However, I don't find his Schopenhauerian view of pleasure being a mere negation of negatives to be a justifiable one. I don't find all needs to be inherently bad. They are neutral when they emerge, and while they can indeed lead to suffering, they can also lead to happiness.
Antinatalists certainly need to think more. Unfortunately, the efilists and promortalists are a lot worse. They only care about fulfilling their agenda of nuking the planet, with discourse only being focused on spreading the popularity of their views. Due to their single-mindedness, reason and epistemic humility are defenestrated quite swiftly.
I've written some articles that attempt to reconstruct moral values in aesthetic terms, which would in turn tie into existentialism and transhumanism. Pleasure and pain would be incidental at best. What would matter are originality, creativity, and transcending animality. So murder would be wrong not so much because it causes pain but because that act would likely be caused by a selfish animal impulse (such as hatred or greed), which would be cliched.
At any rate, that's a counterexample to hedonism or utilitarianism.
Are you going to write about this?
ReplyDeletehttps://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canada-aims-to-block-chelsea-manning-from-entering-country/
Canada's big on red tape. Criminals cut through red tape, so Canada doesn't like criminals. Is whistleblowing criminality? That's the question with Chelsea Manning. It doesn't interest me much.
DeleteBut of course you're the commenter who continually posts links to anti-Canadian articles on this blog, most of which I delete because they're irrelevant. You seem to think that because I'm harshly critical of American culture, I must be a patriotic Canadian. I'm a naturalist who's into existentialism, cosmicism, and philosophy in general. I aim to see through all nationalist myths, so your childish reminders that Canada is flawed are like drops of water rolling off a duck's back.
I'm not sure if there's a genuine dilemma here. Clifford clearly isn't an alpha like Lester. He might try to get some game & silence whatever conscience he has through drugs & alcohol, but even if he is able to make a long term commitment to a life he's so obviously unsuited for, he'd never be anything more than a pale imitation of Lester. And yet he lacks the moral fortitude & capacity for self-delusion that would allow him to follow his conscience & live a contented life of faith like Saul does. So it's a false dilemma: Clifford might admire both of these men & wish he could be like either one or the other, but in fact he can't & is stuck being Clifford.
ReplyDeleteOf course, once this dawns on him, his admiration must inevitably deliquesce into envy & hatred. Cliffords only source of consolation then, would be to somehow bring Lester & Saul down to his level by sabotaging their the foundations of their happiness. Ultimately, he would have to become a monster, worse even than Judah: a kind of malign bodhisattva who's devoted his life, not to enlightening others, but to disillusioning them by exposing their evasions, hidden motives & hypocrisy as well as their crimes & misdemeanors -- not just to others -- but to themselves.
Mishima Yukio's Forbidden Colours explores this idea to some degree. The protagonist is an aging, unattractive misogynist who grooms a handsome young homosexual, transforming him into a sort of male femme fatale whom he uses to avenge himself upon the female sex. I actually couldn't finish that novel; it was just too dark even for me.
Regarding the dilemma, I think you're talking about the article's final paragraph:
Delete"Allen’s film is clearer in its presentation of the existential dilemma: Do we surrender our conscience or our intellectual integrity to be happy like Lester or Judah, or do we sacrifice ourselves for what are supposed to be greater philosophical truths, like Clifford?"
So the dilemma's meant to be for us, the movie's viewers, not for Clifford. (Actually, the dilemma's meant to be universal and is therefore for everyone?) Do we give up on our conscience to be happy in a fallen world, or retain our scruples and suffer alienation from that same world?
It's good to have you back, Sybok. I always enjoy reading your comments. They've spurred my thinking a number of times.
I look forward to your every post & have been reading them regularly; but most of the recent ones have been about movies I haven't seen, so I didn't have any thoughts about them to contribute.
DeleteI suppose my fatalism was showing in my last comment. I don't believe anyone can change themselves that fundamentally. Alienated idealists really have no chance of becoming amoral pragmatists or vice versa -- at least no examples come to mind. Certainly, there have been plenty of people who've experienced their own personal road to Damascus, but the change they underwent was no more fundamental than that dubious apostle's. Satan can no longer tempt someone who has seen through his tawdry illusions. No one can escape themselves.
Hi, I hope that you have been doing well. I wanted to let you know that a person whom I know well (and completely disagree with, since he's an efilist/promortalist) is launching a blog to advocate for pessimism, efilism, and the right to die (I do agree with this). It's going to be called schopenhaueonmars.com and will become active from today (hopefully). So, it might be an interesting resource for you if you wish to address some pessimistic omnicidal ideas. This person has been advocating for this ideology for years, so he's got a fairly consistent framework (although, I would definitely say that it's flawed, for reasons that I have already mentioned everywhere).
ReplyDeleteHope you have a wonderful day!
Edit to previous comment: It's schopenhaueronmars.com
ReplyDeleteHere's the first post: https://schopenhaueronmars.com/2021/09/10/negative-utilitarianism-why-suffering-is-all-that-matters/
ReplyDeleteThe article rambles, but the author says, "suffering is the only source of value in the universe," and "if one accepts an atheistic and materialistic conception of reality, then there can be no such thing as a good or a bad that is not defined exclusively by the feelings of sentient organisms."
DeleteThe second statement runs up against the naturalistic fallacy. The feelings of pleasure and pain aren't inherently good or bad, so there's no such "exclusive" definition.
Those feelings are better thought of as signs of what's good or bad. Pleasure tends to go with what's good, and pain with what's bad, but the feelings aren't the essences of goodness or badness. Some people have experienced mostly pleasure in life, but their life has been bad. See, for example, spoiled, decadent rich people. And others, who've mostly sacrificed themselves for a higher goal, have suffered a lot, but their life has been worthy.
If strict "materialism" is supposed to constrain the moral standards, the notions of goodness and badness are only illusions, so who cares how they're defined? There would be just pleasures and pains as physical facts, not as values. All values would be illusory, in which case there would be no urgency to the goal of ending life or of preventing procreation, since none of our actions or mental states would have a real moral standing.
Eliminative materialism would prove too much and would undercut the moral authority of antinatalism. That's just one of the ways this extreme pessimism is incoherent. I believe I pointed that out to Inmendham and never got a direct response.
The rambling structure of that article seems to me telling. What antinatalists need to do is stop dancing around the core issues and just think hard about what they're saying.
" Some people have experienced mostly pleasure in life, but their life has been bad. See, for example, spoiled, decadent rich people." Why would that be bad? Who sets the standard for what's good or bad?
DeleteThey could be judged bad from a standpoint of non-self-destructive materialism, from a position that posits ideals or goals that aren't determined by physical or chemical processes, but that emerge unpredictably from them.
DeleteThe goal might be to produce an ideal, artificial world, a heaven on earth, and those who work towards achieving that goal are judged more worthy than those who succumb to materialistic degradations and regressions, such as decadent, self-absorbed hedonists.
Thanks for this amazing reply. It's unfortunate that I forgot to check this, or I would have responded sooner.
DeleteI largely agree with you. Antinatalists (particularly efilists) seem keen on boxing people in these narrow labels, like "atheist antinatalism". I guess it's a reflection of their absolutist perspective towards life.
I did have a question regarding the ideals part. I think that the author of that post would argue that the only reason we care about ideals is because they fulfill our needs (and prevent suffering, since they believe all needs are suffering). EG argues that it's an objective fact that sentient beings avoid pain, so the only logical conception of good and bad can come through pain and pleasure (he also argued that this is why we wouldn't be able to explain good and bad to a nonsentient AI). What would be yours response to that?
Personally, I am willing to grant EG, for the sake of the argument, that pleasure and pain constitute good and bad. However, I don't find his Schopenhauerian view of pleasure being a mere negation of negatives to be a justifiable one. I don't find all needs to be inherently bad. They are neutral when they emerge, and while they can indeed lead to suffering, they can also lead to happiness.
Antinatalists certainly need to think more. Unfortunately, the efilists and promortalists are a lot worse. They only care about fulfilling their agenda of nuking the planet, with discourse only being focused on spreading the popularity of their views. Due to their single-mindedness, reason and epistemic humility are defenestrated quite swiftly.
I hope that you have a wonderful October!
I've written some articles that attempt to reconstruct moral values in aesthetic terms, which would in turn tie into existentialism and transhumanism. Pleasure and pain would be incidental at best. What would matter are originality, creativity, and transcending animality. So murder would be wrong not so much because it causes pain but because that act would likely be caused by a selfish animal impulse (such as hatred or greed), which would be cliched.
DeleteAt any rate, that's a counterexample to hedonism or utilitarianism.
Thanks, I shall try to look into them!
Delete